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BRITISH LAND POLICY AND THE AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION 
A BELATED LECTURE IN ECONOMIC HISTORY 
GEORGE O. VIRTUE 
If this were spoken from a pulpit instead of from a teacher's 
rostrum, I should be disposed to take as a text for what follows a 
passage from C. W. Alvord's study of The Mississippi Valley in 
British Politics. From the middle of the 18th century to the Revolu-
tion, how to deal with the great valley was, Alvord holds, the 
number one American problem of every British ministry: How to 
meet the claims of France to it and how to defend it once her 
claims were extinguished; how to meet the claims to it of the sea-
board colonies by virtue of their charters; how to protect the 
Indian title to the soil and against the "frauds and abuses" of 
traders and settlers; and finally, how best to make it of the greatest 
advantage to the English economy. The conflicting claims of France 
and England to the territory were discussed at the close of King 
George's War, 1744-1748, but neither side was prepared for a show-
down and they were left unsettled by the treaty of Aix-la-Chappelle. 
A "cold war" ensued, each party seeking to strengthen its claim to 
the valley by occupation in one form or another, especially at the 
strategic Forks of the Ohio. The English got there "firstest," but 
the French, counting guns, got there with the "mostest," and the 
Virginians were driven back to the Atlantic side of the mountains. 
The "cold war" lasted seven years. Then followed seven years of 
bloody war, 1765-1763. We call it the French and Indian War, but 
it became a worldwide war. In the end France lost heavily in the 
Far East, in the West Indies, and on the North American continent. 
She surrendered Canada with its eighty or ninety thousand French 
population and her claims to the great region west of the Appalach-
ians as far as the Mississippi River, except a small area at the mouth 
of the river held by Spain. How these vast acquisitions were to be 
managed was a problem full of difficulties. Very soon, however, it 
was decided to mark off East Florida and West Florida for the estab-
lishment of separate colonies, and the same was done for Canada 
though more than ten years passed before a colonial government 
was set up there. The great interior region west of the mountains. 
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inhabited, save for a few French settlers in the Illinois country, 
only by scattered Indian tribes, was for the time being left an Im-
perial domain, without any commitment as to future colonial 
status. 
These decisions were announced in the Royal Proclamation on 
North America, October 7, 1763. Recognizing the Indian title to 
the soil, it declared all lands not hitherto purchased or ceded to 
the King a reservation for the use of the Indians until so acquired. 
It forbade the Colonial governors to "presume to make grants" 
of such lands or to purchase them until the King's pleasure should 
be known. All private persons were, likewise, forbidden to make 
purchases of them or to occupy them except on special license first 
obtained; and if any had "willfully or inadvertently" seated them-
selves on lands the title to which had not been acquired by the 
Crown, they were enjoined "forthwith to remove themselves from 
such settlements." The Indian trade, hitherto free, was also brought 
under imperial regulation. All traders were required to secure 
license from the colonial governor and give security to observe the 
regulations prescribed in them. 
By adopting a benevolent attitude toward the Indians, by 
placing the traders under strict regulation, by impliedly fixing 
western boundaries of the colonies at the mountains, by placing 
a sharp restriction upon westward expansion, the Proclamation 
reversed former British policy and ran counter to long-established 
colonial practices. It ran counter, too, to the interest of numerous 
speculators eager to secure grants ahead of the westward expansion 
they foresaw must ere long be underway. Some of the provisions 
were doubtless intended to be temporary, pending the adoption of 
a permanent policy for the western country. They, in fact became 
in a sense permanent through long delays due chiefly to personal 
and factional strife within the government. The chief point of 
contention was whether to permit the colonists to expand west-
ward as they had always done, develop the land resources of the 
region and so increase the Imperial revenues, or to confine them 
to the seaboard where they would best serve the interest of the 
British economy, and reserve the great interior region as hunting-
grounds for the Indians and so preserve the source of supply for 
the valuable fur trade. Well, it was the urge to westward expansion 
that led the colonists to resist the French intrusion into the upper 
Ohio country and to endure a long war for the right to occupy that 
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region. And this brings us to our text: "Through the exigencies of 
politics," says Alvord, "the British ministry had now established 
the same limits of colonization [as the French had set]. In trying 
to maintain these boundaries did Great Britain, like France, lose 
an empire?" 1 This is our problem. 
The great urge to settlement beyond the mountains that became 
startlingly evident about the middle of the century did not come 
primarily from homeseekers. It is true that most of the better lands 
had been taken up for current or future use, but between the large 
holdings there were considerable tracts available for family-sized 
farms. The prime movers for westward expansion were men, al-
ready land-rich, who had learned from experience that the surest 
way to acquire wealth in America was to secure land ahead of migra-
tion. Accumulating information brought back to the settlements 
by traders and explorers gave rise to the vision of a great "inland 
empire" in the west; they would be builders of that empire and 
reap the emoluments due their services. The Indian danger and the 
long stretches of wilderness between the old settlements and the 
proposed new ones, made occupation by individual settlers im-
practicable; it must be "promoted" by men of means just as the 
peopling of Virginia and indeed most of the colonies had been 
promoted, largely through the "indented servant" system. How 
to secure families to found the new settlement was one of the chief 
concerns of the promoters. Soon plans took form beyond the 
means of individual promoters, and companies were formed to 
carry them through. From 1745 to 1754, 34 grants, ranging from 
20,000 to 500,000 acres were made by Virginia alone in the region 
included in what is now West Virginia and eastern Kentucky. This 
was the beginning of the first great American speculative land boom. 
Checked by the French and Indian War and Pontiac's War which 
dovetailed with it, the movement was continued after the Peace of 
1763 with greater vigor and on a grander scale. The number of 
speculators increased and so, too, did their aspirations; in their 
petitions for grants they sought not thousands, but millions, of 
acres; the field of operation was extended to the Great Lakes, to 
the Mississippi River; but it was in the upper Ohio country that 
the competitive struggle was fiercest-a region that was to remain 
1 Alvord, C. W. The MississiPPi Valley in British Politics, II. 91. 
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a bone of contention between Indian tribes, Indians and Whites, 
traders and settlers, between Virginians and the rest of the world, 
including Pennsylvanians, Kentuckians and the Continental Con-
gress. 
Of the numerous speculative ventures in western lands in the 
quarter century preceding the Revolution, three will, for the pur-
pose in hand, require particular attention: that of the Ohio Com-
pany of Virginia, that of the Mississippi Company, and that of 
the Grand Ohio Company seeking the so-called Walpole Grant. 
THE OHIO COMPANY 
While peace negotiations were going on toward the close of 
King George's War, a group composed mainly of Virginia planters 
formed a partnership under the name of the Ohio Company and 
petitioned Lt. Governor Gooch for a large grant of land. This was 
in 1747. The petition was denied on the ground that such a grant 
might embarrass the negotiators; whereupon the Company sent 
their petition to the King.2 It was cordially received by the govern-
meI}t. The question of strengthening its shadowy claims to the 
interior as against the shadowy claims of the French, had been con-
sidered as early as the 1720's when this method of forestalling the 
French was proposed by Governor Spotswood.3 But the time was 
not ripe for such a venture. By 1748 it seemed to be; and here was 
a body of well-to-do, capable men ready to establish and defend a 
settlement at the most strategic point for forestalling the French, 
for protecting the old settlements, and for resisting the pretentions 
S For the memorial as sent to the King, see Kenneth P. Bailey, The Ohio 
Company of Virginia, 298-301. It was presented by John Hanbury, a London 
merchant and banker, onetime member of Parliament. The names of thirteen 
other members appear in the petition. Chief among them is the name of 
Thomas Lee, long a member of the King's Council in the colony and, at the 
time of his death about to be appointed Lt. Governor; Thomas Nelson, also a 
member of the Council; Lawrence Washington and his brother Augustus, and 
George Fairfax, all Virginians. Two or three members lived in Maryland, 
mentioned only as associates. Bailey finds that, first and last, through changes 
in ownership, there were 25 shareholders, some 20 of whom served in the 
House of Burgesses. Of the latecomers, mention should be made of George 
Mason who later became spokesman for the company; George Washington, 
never active in company affairs; and Robert Dinwiddie who succeeded Gooch 
as Lt. Governor in 1751 and took an active-perhaps a too active-part in the 
affairs of the company. The Ohio Company did not lack men of standing. 
• Bailey, Kenneth P. The Ohio Company of Virginia, 22, 256. 
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of the French, and all at their own expense. It, however, required 
all of 1748 and well into the next year to arrange all details of the 
concession, and it was not till July 1749 that the governor, follow-
ing instructions from the King, made the grant.4 
The grant did not pass title to any land; that, in this case, had 
to be earned. It provided that when the company had settled two 
hundred families upon the land to be granted within seven years 
and had built and garrisoned a fort for their protection, title would 
be given to 200,000 acres of land; and that an additional 300,000 
acres would be patented on like conditions-settling 100 families 
for each 100,000 acres; all to be free of quit rents for ten years after 
title was given. The grant was made on these conditions. What 
were the motives of the government in making it? 
Because of the outcome of the war which soon followed, it has 
been generally believed that the grant was made in pursuance of a 
plan of territorial expansion. If that was the government's purpose, 
it was kept in the background. There seems to have been no in-
clination even now to bring the question of dominion to an issue. 
There was, in fact, a more immediate interest to be promoted. 
Professor McIlwain has persuasively argued,5 that it is a mis-
take to ascribe the long-standing rivalry between British and French 
in the West "to a competition for territory, a hunger for land .. :' 
Contemporary documents show, he says, that so. far as the English 
government was concerned, "trade rather than land was the chief 
ground of friction." The petitioners for the Ohio grant understood 
the British interest in the fur trade and disclose their own interest 
in it. It has been customary to regard the company as of a kind with 
the numerous speculations of the period. It was, indeed, a land 
company, but it was something more than that. It was also a coloni-
zing and a trading company. The greater part of the petition is 
taken up with the favorable oportunity offered by the friendly 
• This like other "grants" of the period only gave authority to search for, 
pick and choose the specified acreage within limits often necessarily vague be-
cause of lack of geographical knowledge. In the present case the area of selec-
tion was between certain creeks "on the south side of the River Aligane, other-
wise the Ohio," and between certain creeks on the. north side of that stream 
"or in such other parts to the west of said mountains as shall be adjudged most 
proper by your Petitioners." 
• In his Introduction to Peter Wraxall's Abridgement of the Indian Affairs, 
(of New York) 1915. Charles H. McIlwain, ed. 
6 BRITISH LAND POLlCY AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 
attitude of the western Indians, their inclination "to trade solely 
with your Majesty's subjects," their desire that the inhabitants of 
Virginia "send them British goods and manufactures," a service 
Virginia was favorably situated for performing because of its easy 
access to the interior by way of the Potomac and the Monongahela 
and so to Lake Erie. The proposed settlement and fort would 
strengthen the frontier and be "the means of gaining a vast addi-
tion and increase to your Majesties subjects of that rich Branch 
of the Peltry and Furr Trade . . . and at the same time greatly 
promote the Consumption of Our own British Manufactures, en-
large Our Commerce, increase our shipping and Navigation and 
extend your Majesty's Empire in America and, in a short space of 
time, very considerably increase Your Majesty's Revenue of Quit 
Rents." For, it was argued, the company's settlement once estab-
lished, great numbers of "Foreign Protestants would wish to settle 
in this fertile region." It was for promoting these national ends 
that the grant was justified. 
The role of the fur trade in the colonial economy, as McIlwain 
says, has not been adequately realized. It was from the beginning, 
an important factor in the welfare of every colony, both for use 
and for export. As the agricultural frontier moved westward and 
the fur bearing animals were all but exterminated, so, too, was the 
Indian trade. By the middle of the 18th century the bulk of that 
trade was with the tribes west of the mountains, most of it 
channelled through New York to Albany. This was made possible 
by the long, firm friendship which from the Dutch period on had 
existed between the colony and the Iroquois (the Six Nations). This 
strong confederation, asserting a sort of overlordship over the 
western tribes, did not permit a direct trade between them and 
Albany. They themselves received the western furs and disposed 
of thel!1 to the English. But not all the tribes carried their peltry 
to the Iroquois. Some were in alliance-had trade relations-with 
the French whose traders had long ranged widely over the west-
but mainly, it appears, in territory tributory to the Lakes and to the 
Mississippi. Although English traders had, since the Treaty of 
Utrecht, 1713, had equal rights with the French to trade "without 
molestation" in the western country, they were slow in exercising it. 
During the second quarter of the century they began to penetrate 
behind the mountains and by the end of that period it was estimated 
there were 300 of them, most of them Pennsylvanians, in the Ohio 
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country and northward to the Lakes region. Rivalry increased 
with numbers. DeNoyan, in charge of the important trading post 
at Detroit, wrote, "The English have been coming for a Number 
of years to Corrupt the Savages within the Sphere of this Post. I 
have resolved to have them pillaged. I will Begin by Sending them 
a Summons." 6 One way of "corrupting" the Indians was to offer 
higher prices for their furs than the French could give; (this for 
several reasons, among them the offer of British rum as against 
French brandy). There was ground for French alarm; for the fur 
trade was a more important element in the Canadian economy than 
in that of the English colonists, and the French government, as 
well as the English, regarded it as a great national interest. The 
French, as Hulbert points out, had felt secure in the exploitation 
of the upper Ohio country because of its mountain barrier; but 
the English traders, especially the Pennsylvanians, had demonstrated 
that the mountains, though an obstacle, were not, for the French, 
a secure defense against the intrusion of English traders. Hitherto 
the southern colonies had had to be content with the less valuable 
peltry found in the more accessible hunting-grounds of their back-
country. The Ohio Company of Virginia now proposed to establish 
itself in the rich fur-bearing region of the upper Ohio. 
The company lost no time in launching this branch of their 
enterprise. In February, 1748, a few days after its petition was 
presented in London, and more than a year before it was finally 
acted upon, the partners voted an assessment on themselves for the 
purchase of "Indian goods" and sent an order to John Hanbury, 
their London member, to be filled by installments as it was judged 
the goods would be needed. It was stipulated that the amount 
should not exceed 4,000 pounds sterling. They apparently expected 
their banker member to carry the account in part, for the assess-
ment made was only 100 pounds sterling per member.7 Whether 
this prompt action was taken on the assumption that their grant 
of land was certain to be allowed, or because of a determination in 
any case to engage in trade, is not certain. The next year they 
bought land and built a store-house on the Maryland side of the 
upper Potomac, where Cumberland now stands. In the fall soon 
after their grant was made they "employed Gentlemen to discover 
• Quoted by McIlwain (XVI) from Wisconsin Historical Collections, XVII, 358, 
• Bailey, The Ohio Company of Virginia, 69. 
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lands beyond the mountains." At the end of a year they had "made 
no considerable progress" and toward the end of 1750 Christopher 
Gist was selected to make the search for suitable lands and to cul-
tivate friendship with the Indians. Two years were consumed in 
this task. He explored the region north of the Ohio as far west as 
the Great Miami and south of the Ohio as far as the Great Kanawha. 
It was in this latter quarter that he found the best lands for settle-
ment, protected against danger from the north and free, as it was 
thought, from conflicting claims. The company petitioned the 
Governor and Council for leave to survey and take· up its grant 
in the Kanawha region. This being denied, it was then decided to 
petition the King for an enlargement of the grant of 1749, and to 
have it all located within clearly defined boundaries, the company 
agreeing to settle an additional 100 families and to build two 
additional forts, one of them at the forks of the Kanawha and the 
Ohio.s It was not till April 2, 1754, that this petition reached the 
Board of Trade. In the meanwhile a crisis had been reached in the 
affairs of the Ohio Company, and of the Empire. 
The history of the company is a catalog of misfortunes. First of 
all Thomas Lee, the moving spirit of the enterprise, died in 
February 1751, and little more than year later Lawrence Washing-
ton after a long illness also died. To this loss of leadership is 
probably due the long delay in beginning operations. As already 
pointed out, the company from the first encountered hostility with-
in the colony. The reason given by Lt. Governor Gooch for denying 
the company's petition was not his only one. He trained with a 
political faction opposed for reasons of its own, to the group, closely 
related by blood and marriage, which formed the Ohio Company. 
When the King reminded the governor that he had authority under 
his instructions to make grants and directed him to proceed with 
that on the Ohio, he used it to make a series of grants in the same 
general region. Among them was one of 800,000 acres made on 
the very day the Ohio Company's grant was announced, to a group 
known as the Loyal Company. Another notable grant was that 
made by Governor Dinwiddie's proclamation, to soldiers enlisting 
for military service on the frontier in 1754. These grants added to 
• The Ohio Company,70; and the Company's Petition of 1754 for an Enlarge-
ment of their grant, 306-307. Bailey says young George Washington was sent 
out to "survey" lands for the company. I have found no confirmation of this. 
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those previously made, created a situation which made it impossible 
as Washington later declared, for anyone to be certain of securing 
a title to the land he selected. 
Conditions on the upper Ohio were further complicated by con-
flicting territorial claims. Pennsylvania's western boundary was set 
at five degrees west of the Delaware River, but the line had never 
been run. The major activities of the company, including the con-
struction of a fort, were carried on in disputed territory which later 
was found to be well within the Penn grant. This territorial conflict 
sharpened the resentment of the Pennsylvania traders against the 
"interlopers" from the south and brought about relations little 
"short of war." They industriously spread the information among 
the Indians that the Ohio Company intended to take their land, 
to make a settlement, to build a strong-house, creating a distrust 
of the company never overcome. French traders pursued the same 
tactics. When the Ohio Company was formed, interference from 
Canada with its project seemed remote; as Thomas Lee wrote the 
Board of Trade, there was then no French danger. By 1750 that 
danger had to be reckoned with. The year before Celeron had ap-
peared on the Ohio with his leaden plates, taking formal possession 
of the territory in the name of his King, and warning the Indians 
not to trade with the English. This was the first step in what proved 
to be a plan for establishing the French claims to the Ohio country. 
Whether it was taken as a counter-move to the Ohio Company 
project is not clear. As the months went by English traders were 
warned against trespassing on French territory, several of them 
were seized and carried off to Canada, the Indians who trafficked 
with the English were threatened and in 1752 the important Miami 
village of Pickawillamy was destroyed. By the early summer of 
1753 the situation had become alarming to the Virginians. Word 
had been received that the French were building a line of forts 
from Lake Erie to the Allegheny. The intent seemed obvious-to 
establish themselves at the junction of that river with the Mononga-
hela, a point recognized by all as of great strategic importance. 
The Ohio Company was galvanized into action. The year be-
fore a conference of the Ohio Tribes had been assembled at Logs-
town on the Ohio a few miles below the Forks, ostensibly to receive 
presents the company had promised them as a seal of friendship. 
But there was other business on the agenda of the company. The 
Virginians wanted leave to build a fort on the Ohio. Historically 
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Indian policy had steadily opposed white men's forts in their terri-
tory, but in face of the present danger from the north, consent was 
readily given. The company wanted their right recognized to make 
settlements west of the mountains. Did the right given to build a 
fort imply the right to make setlements and to own the land on 
which they were made? This question was put to the Half-King of 
the Senecas, the chief spokesman for the Indians; his answer was, 
no. The River tribes had repudiated the pretended sale to the 
English, of lands west of the mountains by the Six Nations at Lan-
caster in 1744. He did not understand that Virginia had any lands 
there; and "it was only in the power of the Onondago Council to 
dispose of Ohio territory; but later that day," says Bailey cryptically, 
he "agreed to English settlements east of that river." 9 With the 
fort and the settlements agreed to, a treaty was drawn up and 
duly signed. At a conference held at Winchester the next year 
(September, 1753) for the purpose of forming an alliance with all 
the tribes of the region to resist the French, and to secure confirma-
tion of the Logstown Treaty, all efforts to induce the Indians to 
surrender title to their lands were in vain. A spokesman for the 
Indians summed up their attitude on these questions. There had 
been much talk, he said, of driving the French out of the Ohio 
country: "And brother, when we do that, we will consider what 
to say about the lands; and as to the strong-house that is to be 
built." (Bailey, p. 141). 
In August, 1753, William Trent, an experienced trader from 
Pennsylvania, now employed by the Ohio Company on the Monon-
gahela, sent Dinwiddie further details of the French advance and 
added that the Half-King of the Senecas "had been appointed to 
warn the French off Indian lands." A French officer told him, 
as later reported by Washington, that the Indians had no lands, 
they all belonged to his master the King; "you do not own as much 
land as the black of your finger nail." 
Already the company had been roused by the activities of the 
French to take belated action with respect to the fort. At a meeting 
in July plans and specifications were drawn up for one to be built 
(at the Forks, as it turned out) and for a town to be laid out ad-
joining if the lay of the land permitted. George Mason was author-
• The Ohio Company of Virginia, 135·137. This seems to refer to the 
Monongahela, sometimes called the Ohio. 
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ized to send an order to their merchant-member, Hanbury in Lon-
don for twenty swivel guns and ammunition for the fort. A little 
later an assessment was made on the members for the purchase of 
supplies and for the employment of men to build the fort. But it 
was not till late in December, 1753, that the expedition was started 
on its way to the Forks. 
The news which had roused the Ohio Company to action 
created a sense of alarm throughout the colonies and in England. 
The governor of Pennsylvania wrote DinwiddIe to learn what had 
been done about building the fort that had been decided upon four 
years before and that had been used by the Pennsylvania traders 
to create Indian distrust of the Virginians. He offered the assistance 
of his colony to carry it forward; an assistance which, although 
backed by the proprietors, he was never able to give. DinwiddIe had 
already written the home government describing the danger which 
threatened the colony, and suggesting "the utility of building some 
forts upon the Ohio in the western part of Virginia." It was autumn 
before a reply was received in the form of a letter of instructions 
for meeting the French danger. The suggestion to build forts on 
the Ohio "at the charge of the colony" was approved, and "thirty 
cannon of four-pounders" with appropriate stores, were ordered 
to be consigned to the governor. He was directed to call out and 
arm the militia; and in case obstructions were encountered in 
building the forts, "to meet force by force." The instructions went 
farther. If any Europeans, not British subjects, should be found 
to have built forts or should presume to do so, within the limits 
of Virginia or other English colony, the governor was authorized, 
after due warning "to take appropriate action." No indication was 
given as to "the limits of Virginia or other colony" the government 
was ready thus to defend. First of all, however, the governor was 
instructed to obtain accurate information as to the extent and 
character of the French fortifications, and the military strength of 
their support. 
It was in pursuance of this last instruction that George Wash-
ington, October 21, 1753, was sent on his mission to carry Din-
widdie's warning to the French on the upper Allegheny against 
intrusion on British territory and to request the intruders peaceably 
to depart. The reply was what might have been expected. This 
and the report Washington brougIit back in mid-January, 1754, 
that the French planned to move to the Ohio in the Spring, led 
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to energetic action on the part of Governor Dinwiddie. He called 
the House of Burgesses to convene at the earliest possible date-
a month hence; he directed two county lieutenants in charge of the 
militia to enlist volunteers for service and assemble them at 
Alexandria; he sent a Captain's commission to William Trent, an 
experienced Indian trader in the employ of the Ohio Company, 
and directed him to raise a company of 100 men and take them to 
the Forks to join others to be sent for the protection of the fort; 
he appointed John Carlyle, another member of the company, as 
commissary of supplies and stores; in order to stimulate enlistment 
he issued a proclamation10 which promised 200,000 acres of land 
on the Ohio for those who served in the companies to be raised, 
and, in accordance with his instructions, he called upon the gover-
nors of other colonies to furnish aid in meeting a common danger. 
The Burgesses who met at Williamsburg in the middle of 
February were in no mood to co-operate with the governor. He 
had sent them home only a few weeks before in the midst of a 
bitter quarrel over the imposition of an additional fee-the famous 
"pistole fee," to be charged against grants of land. But back of 
this there were fundamental questions to be answered: did the 
region occupied belong to the French or was that designed to be 
occupied part of Virginia; was it English territory; would war-like 
preparations lead to actual war; was the governor asking for funds 
to safeguard the interests of the Empire, of the colony, or of a 
private company? As a member of the company the governor was 
in an embarrassing position. But he might well have said he was 
acting in the interest of all. The King had chosen to subsidize the 
company as a spearhead-as a means of establishing English rights, 
whether of trade or territory, in a sort of no-man's land and he, 
Dinwiddie, had been instructed by the King to assert and protect 
those rights by force if necessary. 
In the end a small appropriation was made and the governor's 
plan went forward. He appointed a colonel of the regiment to be 
raised. He appointed George Washington to command the little 
troop of volunteers assembled at Alexandria, and later ordered him 
to proceed to the Forks to protect the workmen on the fort. Wash-
ington began his march on April 2, 1754, the very day the Ohio 
Company's petition for an enlarged grant on the Kanawha was 
10 The Ohio Company Papers, Kenneth P. Bailey ed. 25·26. 
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laid before the Board of Trade. The correspondencell between 
the young officer and the governor is the best source of information 
about the expedition. It unfolds a story of incredible hardships, and 
final failure. When Washington reached the Ohio Company's store 
house on the upper Potomac (Wills Creek) he learned that the 
French had driven the workmen away from the unfinished fort. 
He decided to move forward in the hope of retrieving it, opening as 
he went a road for supply wagons that did not come. When he 
reached the Great Meadows he did receive a reinforcement-an "In-
dependent Company" of North Carolinians commanded by one 
Captain McKaye who had a royal commission. It proved to be an 
embarrassment, not an aid; neither the captain nor his men would 
obey the orders of a colonial officer of whatever rank-would not 
even salute him. The young provincial got his first lesson on his 
position in the British scheme of things. While at this place, he 
learned from Indian scouts of a detachment of French in a con-
cealed position not far away. By a night march he came upon the 
party, fired upon it, killing a score, including the officer in command. 
The rest, some 20 men and officers surrendered and were sent back 
to Winchester. After a few days spent in clearing the meadow of 
bushes, he began his "march to Redstone Creek" on the Mononga-
hela. He met hunters, traders and friendly Indians fleeing before 
a large force of French and Indians-it proved to be 700 strong-
was deserted by his Indian "allies," was himself compelled to fall 
back to his improvised fort at Great Meadows, closely followed by 
the enemy. Here after an all-day fight he capitulated, and was 
allowed the next morning, July 4, 1754, to march off to the settle-
ments, leaving the French in control of the Ohio country and the 
great valley. Braddock's expedition the next year likewise failed 
to retake the fort at the Forks. For the time being the English 
were confined to the Atlantic side of the mountains.12 
The events just narrated came at the end of the seven-year 
period in which the Ohio Company was to earn its grant. It had 
failed to do so; legally it was dead, as has often been said. But if 
it was dead its ghost walked in London for ten eventful years and 
11 Writings of George Washington, Fitzpatrick, ed. Vol. I. 
II In 1758 the Forbes expedition fitted out in Pennsylvania and moving over 
the Traders route crossed the mountains and reached the fort only to find it 
empty. The French had moved northward. 
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at Williamsburg much longer, seeking for an equitable settlement 
of the company's claims, a settlement it never got; and therein lies 
the reason for this extended account of the fortunes of the enter-
prise. 
We shall hear more of the company as we proceed. But here 
some account of its ill-directed efforts to secure restorative measures 
may be added. Even before the close of the war, in 1760, counsel 
was employed in London to protect the Company's interests, but 
without result. In 1763, George Mercer, a member of the company. 
was sent over for the same purpose. The choice was not a fortunate 
one. Thomas P. Abernathy, in his Western Land and the American 
Revolution, tells us that he distinguished himself by eloping with 
a nobleman's daughter and by serving a term in a debtor's jail. 
In 1765 he secured an appointment as stamp collecter for Virginia. 
The reception he received there was such that within a fortnight he 
was on his way back to London. From time to time he petitioned 
the government for a reaffirmation of the grant and remuneration 
for the damage done the Company's property by Braddock's army. 
In 1770 without authority from the American members, he merged 
the company with a larger enterprise on the Ohio. Two years 
later the agreement was repudiated by the company. George 
Mason was now spokesman for the home members. In 1773, follow-
ing the example of others who had claims to lands in the West, 
and like them ignoring British authority, he engaged surveyers to 
layoff, in the Kentucky country, the 200,000 acres believed to be 
justly due the Ohio Company. They, in fact, surveyed tracts con-
taining some 800,000 acres. It is not clear what his next step was 
to be. It was a time when the governor, Lord Dunmore, and the 
council were, quite contrary to law, authorizing surveys, and passing 
titles to claimants in closed territory, and it seems probable that 
Mason hoped to gain title from the same source. But his surveys 
lagged and by the time they were ready, the war was on and Dun-
more was in retreat. In 1777 the twenty-five years of life of the com-
pany, as fixed in 1752, came to an end. The next year Mason made 
a last appeal to the Virginia assembly on behalf of the company. 
Six of the members were living in England. mostly in arrears. For 
these he made no special plea. For the American members he asked 
for an act of the assembly authorizing the issue of a patent to each 
for his proportionate share of 200,000 acres of land, upon payment 
of the customary "Right-Money" (10 shillings per 100 acres) in lieu 
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of the obligation in the original grant to build and garrison a fort. 
No action was ever taken on the petition. In 1792 Mason died 
leaving to his son his share of stock and his share of the company's 
assets when determined. These consisted of the land bought at 
Wills Creek in 1748, and a few tracts Mason had bought with bor-
rowed money and held in trust for the company. When these debts 
were paid the assets were found to be 102 pound, 12 shillings, 
9 pence.13 
As has already been pointed out, when the war ended and the 
Pontiac uprising was suppressed, with England in undisputed con-
trol of the great valley, the invasion of the West took on new 
dimensions. Individual families now found it feasible to cross the 
mountains in search of new homes. Speculative enterprises took 
on new dimensions. The size of grants. sought, as before stated, 
rose from thousands, to millions of acres. Two of these claim our 
special attention: that of the Mississippi Company, and that of the 
Philadelphia trading company of Boynton, Wharton, and Morgan 
which played a part in several undertakings and finally in the forma-
tion of the Grand Ohio Company, beneficiary of the "Walpole 
grant," and promoter of the colony of Vandalia. 
THE MISSISSIPPI COMPANY 
A month before the Proclamation on North America was is-
sued, a group of Virginians with a few residents of Maryland formed 
a partnership for the purpose of acquiring western land, and 
adopted a memorial to the King praying for a grant of 2,500,000 
acres on the westernmost boundary of the newly acquired territory. 
It was to be selected from an area to be bounded as follows: starting 
at the. mouth of the Ohio, up the Mississippi 120 miles, thence east 
to the Wabash, down that stream to its mouth and continuing 
southward to the Tennessee River, westward to the Mississippi and 
up that river to the place of beginning. The petitioners represented 
themselves as fifty in number, as being "of good families with con-
siderable influence in the counties where they live," and as "possess-
ed of moderate fortune." A scanning of the list of the eighteen 
members present at the meeting of September 9, 1763, confirms this 
18 For the later history of the company see Bailey's The Ohio Company of Vir-
ginia, 269-281. Various petitions of the compay are printed in the appendix; 
that of 1778 on pages !l20-!l27. 
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general character of the group not yet brought to its full member-
ship. There were two Washingtons, four Lees, and two Fitzhughes. 
They were not without experience in such enterprises; one-third 
of those present were, or had been, members of the Ohio Company. 
The petitioners, it is evident, were familiar with the principles of 
British commercial policy. They pointed out that a population 
would be attracted to the region by its richness and by easy terms 
of acquiring land, which would soon be producing commodities 
most wanted by Great Britain, "now purchased of foreigners at 
very great expense, such as Hemp, Flax, Indigo, Iron ... and Naval 
Stores;" and further that the inhabitants, devoted from interest 
to agriculture "will not think of interfering with the Mother Coun-
try in Manufactures but afford a .never failing demand for them." 
The petitioners said little about the French and the Indian danger; 
they assumed, however, that the British government would take 
steps to provide military protection against those dangers and sug-
gested two points within their area suitable for forts. Nothing 
is said in the petition about how the people of the expected settle-
ment were to be governed, whether by Virginia laws,14 as a separate 
colony, or under a military establishment. It is clear there was no 
expectation of setting up a new proprietary colony. The articles 
of agreement provided that the grant if secured should be divided 
into fifty equal parts, 50,000 acres for each share, and assigned by 
lot. Mr. Thomas Cumming of London was chosen to present the 
petition and to "procure subscribers to the scheme not exceeding 
nine of such influence and fortune as may be likely to promote its 
success." No such persons seem ever to have been found and little 
if any official consideration was given to the memorial. There was 
reason for this. The Pontiac War was in full swing, and, at the 
very moment the company was framing its petition, the ministry was 
hastening the Proclamation on North America in the hope of quiet-
ing the general unrest by removing its causes. It placed the Indians, 
as we have seen, under Imperial supervision;15 it recognized the 
Indian ownership of the land and provided that it could be ceded 
.. Carter points out, in another connection, that, in 1738, when Virginia 
created the frontier county of Augusta, its eastern boundary was fixed at the 
Blue Ridge Mountains and its western boundary at "the utmost limits of 
Virginia." The Illinois Country, 103 . 
.. The plan of supervision was elaborated the next year, 1764. It provided 
for two superintendents of Indian affairs, one for the region north of the 
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or sold only to the King at a public meeting; and it forbade all 
British subjects to occupy lands thus reserved for Indian hunting 
grounds, and ordered any who had occupied such lands to depart 
from them forthwith. The planting of settlements deep in the 
Indian country was no part of British policy in 1763. For five years 
the affairs of the Mississippi Company remained quiescent. Toward 
the end of 1768 it came to life again. Dr. Arthur Lee appeared in 
London with a new petition for a grant of 2Y2 million acres to be 
selected within an area lying between the 38th and 42nd parallels 
of latitude and extending from the Alleghenies "westward to the 
dividing line." The reason for this shift of interest from the lower 
Ohio country to the upper Ohio will be clearer after dealing with 
certain aspects of British policy toward the west which appear in 
this'important year of 1768. It may be said at once, however, that 
the company's second petition fared scarcely better than the first. 
It was read in the Council December 16, 1768, was referred to the 
Board of Trade in the March following and there "considered" in 
May, 1770. This seems to close the official history of the company. 
Meanwhile another group of speculators had entered the lists for 
grants both on the Mississippi and in the upper Ohio Country, 
and to these we now turn. 
THE V AN~ALIA ENTERPRISE 
Before taking up the new competition on the Ohio, it will be 
well to mention another early attempt, this time by Pennsylvanians, 
to secure a grant of land on the Mississippi. The episode is worth 
recounting because it led to an important decision by the ministry 
concerning the ever-present western question and because it serves 
also to introduce us to a small but energetic group of men con-
nected with the subject of this section, the great Walpole Grant and 
the plan to create a new proprietory colony on territory claimed 
by Virginia. 
In the spring of 1766 a partnership was formed at Philadelphia 
for the purpose of acquiring land in the "Illinois Country." The 
original purpose was to purchase the land of the French settlers in 
Ohio, the other for the region south of that river, and defined their powen. 
Sir William Johnson of New York colony was appointed as superintendent of 
the northern district. He played a conspicuous part in western affairs till his 
death in 1774. 
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that region who, it was supposed, would leave in considerable num-
bers when French authority should be formally turned over to the 
English. The idea originated with George Croghan, deputy of Sir 
William Johnson, Superintendent of Indian affairs for the northern 
district. As early as 1764, when in London on semi-official business, 
he ~ad suggested to the Board of Trade that if these lands could 
be acquired by English subjects, they might become the basis of 
"a respectable colony." He later discussed the purchase as a 
personal venture with Johnson and had received his approval,16 
Now, in March 1766, while in Philadelphia arranging for a ship-
ment of goods to "the Illinois" for reconciling the Indians to the 
change of sovereignty, he discussed his plans with the trading firm 
of Boynton, Wharton, and Morgan with which he had an exclusive 
contract for supplying the Indian goods required in his district for 
"presents." The firm had long been engaged in the Indian trade 
on the upper Ohio and was now preparing to extend their opera-
tions to the rich fur-bearing country of the Illinois. It may have 
been for prudential reasons that Croghan was willing to share his 
enterprise with the trading company,l1 At any rate it was decided 
to form a company and a few friends were invited to join in the 
speculation, among them Sir William Franklin, at the time governor 
of New Jersey. The prospect seemed promising that a colony 
and a civil government must soon be established in that quarter 
and this led Governor Franklin to propose that a grant of land 
be applied for. This being approved, articles of agreement were 
drawn forming the "Illinois Company." It was agreed, in addition 
to the purchase of French lands, to petition the King for a grant 
of "Twelve Hundred Thousand acres of land, and more thereof 
if to be procured," and provision was made for raising the necessary 
funds for the division of the land when acquired, and for admitting 
a limited number of additional partners. The agreement was 
signed by the members of the trading firm, including three Whar-
tons, and by Governor Franklin, Joseph Galloway, long a well-
known political figure in the province, John Hughes, and George 
18 Alvord and Carter, The New Regime, Johnson's letter p. 4. 
U Croghan wrote Johnson in November, 1765, about certain reports "scanda-
lous, injurious to me," adding ... "I have always avoided the imputation of a 
Moneymaker since my appointment in the Indian department." The New 
Regime, 55. 
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Croghan who signed also for Sir William Johnson. The agreement 
was sent to the Superintendent for his approval, which it received. 
It was not till July that Johnson received from the company its 
petition for a land grant, to be forwarded by him to the Colonial 
Secretary through Benjamin Franklin who had been made a partner 
and was to act as London agent for the company. The memorial 
was written by Sir William Franklin, but neither his name nor 
johnson's was to appear in the matter. It was accompanied by a 
long series of notes headed: "Reasons for establishing a British 
Colony at the Illinois with some Proposals for carrying the same into 
immediate Execution." 18 The reasons given were not unlike those 
put forward three years before by the Mississippi Company and 
those being currently pressed by General Phineas Lyman and the 
military adventurers, and they need not be recounted here. The 
boundaries proposed included the present state of Illinois, extended 
northward to the 'Visconsin River which was to be followed to its 
source, thence eastward by portage and the Fox River to Lake 
Michigan, the western and southern shore of which was to be fol-
lOwed; thence eastward to Lake Erie and along its southern shore 
to the mouth of the Maumee River. The final link in the boundaries 
was this stream and the portage from it to the Wabash. It was sug-
gested that it would be necessary for the Crown to purchase all 
Indian rights to the land between the Illinois and the Ohio rivers 
and fifty miles eastward from the Mississippi; "This would be a 
sufficient Tract·to begin a Colony upon." A civil government should 
be provided and placed under a governor "experienced in the man-
agement of Indian Affairs, and who has given proofs of his influence 
with the Savages.' The proposals for speedy settlement of the colony 
were: (1) To grant land in specified amounts to men and officers 
who had served in the King's forces on the condition; that they 
settle upon it; and (2) A grant to the Illinois Company (not named, 
but described as "a Company of Gentlemen of Character and 
Fortune"), say the twelve hundred thousand acres of land petitioned 
for, on condition that 2,000 persons be settled on it within a speci-
fied time after the grant or the arrival of a governor for the colony. 
When in September Franklin received the company's papers, 
he acted with alacrity.19 He found that Lord Shelburne, who had 
,. Alvord and Carter, The New Regime, 1765-1767, pp. 247-257. 
,. A pretty fair record of his activity in the matter is found in his letters 
to his son. Works (Smyth ed.) Vols. 4 and 5. 
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recently become a Secretary of State for the Colonies, was favorable 
to western expansion but unconvinced as to the desirability of a 
colony on the Mississippi, and long remained so. The chief interest 
of the ministry in the colonies, now that the Stamp Act had been 
repealed, was how to increase the revenue from them and reduce 
expenses. Shelburne was looked to for plans to attain these ends. 
He was opposed to any new taxation which, by the beginning of 
1767, the Chancellor of the Exchequer was hinting at. 
He had opposed the Stamp Act, had voted for its repeal and 
against the Declaratory Act, not because he doubted the doctrine 
of parliamentary supremacy but because he thought it impolitic, 
in view of the existing state of mind in America. Where, then, 
was he to find the additional revenue expected from the colonies? 
For a century and a half the Crown had been granting land to all 
and sundry for a pittance, reserving a small annual payment in 
perpetuity, called, from its feudal origin, a quit-rent. It was well 
known that the collection of these rents had been notoriously ir-
regular, the revenue disappointingly small; and now here was a 
great new region in the west about to be opened as he thought, to 
occupation. It was to the government's great land interests that 
Shelburne looked for additional American revenue. In December, 
1766, he called upon colonial officials for detailed information 
regarding every aspect of land grants and quit rents, and for sug-
gestions to improve their administration. He must have found 
the replies as they came in disappointing. In the proprietary 
colonies, the quit-rents went to the proprietors; in New England, 
only the memory of the Andros attempt to impose such a charge re-
mained; all efforts to reform the system had met with little success; 
and in any case improved administration in the old colonies or the 
opening of the west would require time and could provide only a 
future revenue. 
Equally baffling was the outlook for a reduction of expenses. 
The heavy cost of provisioning the military posts recently taken 
over from the French was in itself formidable; the Indian service 
directed by the Superintendents had proved to be expensive beyond 
all expectations, especially the item of "presents" necessary to keep 
the Indians pacified; the requirement that all trade should be car-
l"ied on at the military posts required the maintenance there of 
"Commissaries of Indian affairs" charged with the supervision of 
all trade, the settling of trade disputes, and promoting harmonious 
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relations between whites and natives. Each post also had an 
interpreter and a blacksmith for the convenience of the natives 
without charge. The expense of imperial control of the west in 
the interest of the King's new wards was indeed burdensome. 
Shelburne was not without advice concerning a course to pursue. 
There was Lord Barrington at the War Office, for example, who, 
with half-knowledge of the western question, recommended the 
withdrawal of the western garrisons, the confinement of the traders 
within the Proclamation line, in order to prevent them, "by cheating 
and misusing the natives, from bringing on national quarrels," 
thus leaving it to the Indians to come to the back settlements with 
their peltry for exchange. All this was based on the theory that: 
"the Country on the westward of our Frontier quite to the 
Mississippi was intended to be a desert for the Indians to hunt in 
and inhabit." 20 Shelburne, who held no such view of the future 
of the West, was not influenced by this naive proposal to curtail 
colonial expenses. But when in the spring of 1767, the Chancellor 
of the Exchequer called upon him for his estimates-it was virtually 
a demand for a reduction of expenses,-he was unable to comply 
because his plans for the West were not matured. This led to some-
thing like a "battle royal" according to Professor R. A. Humphreys,21 
who attributes his failure to decide upon a plan of action to 
Shelburne's personal qualities which seemed to unfit him for the 
position he occupied, among them a sort of "academic hesitancy." 
The hero of the "battle" was the Chancellor, Charles Townshend, 
whose personal traits were in striking contrast to those of the Secre-
tary. Lecky describes him as a man of "extraordinary comprehen-
sion ... exuberance of animal spirits, a brilliant and ever ready 
wit, a man of clear, rapid, and spontaneous eloquence," but lacking 
in earnestness of character and loyalty to his colleagues. During 
the long illness of the prime minister, he had acquired an ascend-
ency in the cabinet which no one was courageous enough to chal-
lenge. At the beginning of the year he had let it be known that he 
had found a way of raising a colonial revenue free from the ob-
jections urged against the Stamp Act; and now in May, 1767, he 
.0 The New Regime, pp. 234-243. 
""Lord Shelburne and British Colonial Policy," English Historical Review, 
50, pp. 257-277. Ibid, Vol. 49, pp. 241-63 for Shelburne's relation to the Proclama-
tion of 1763. 
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introduced two bills designed for that purpose. One of them pro-
vided for the creation of a Board of Commissioners of Customs 
charged with the enforcement of the Navigation Acts; the other, 
brought in without authorization by the cabinet, imposed duties 
on a few colonial imports, among them a three-penny tax on tea. 
He was the readier to father these bills, it may be said, because 
the landed interest in Parliament had just succeeded, against his 
protest, in reducing the English land tax by twenty-five per cent. 
There were indeed strong arguments for these laws, but as Leay 
points out, there was a stronger one against them, namely that, as 
events proved, it was not possible to enforce them. That Townshend 
thought it was, says Lecky, "is a strange instance of the fallibility 
of political foresight." 
It was in the midst of this turmoil over colonial aflairs that 
Shelburne was cautiously working out a plan for the West that 
would be just, safeguard both Empire and colonial interests, and 
would meet the approval of a divided cabinet. Franklin had neglect-
ed no opportunity to press judiciously the importance of planting a 
colony in the Illinois, and at length he was able to report progress. 
On a day in August he dined with Shelburne, General Conway 
(formerly Colonial Secretary) being also a guest. He found them 
considering possible ways of reducing the expenses of adimnistra-
tion in the West, one of them the dismissal of the Superintendents 
and the return of control of Indian trade to the provinces. It seems 
like a ready-made occasion for Franklin. 
"I took the opportunity," he wrote his son, August 28, 1767, "of 
urging it as one means of saving expense in supporting the out-
posts, that a settlement should be made in the Illinois country, 
expatiated on the various advantages, namely, furnishing pro-
visions cheaper to the garrisons, securing the country, retaining 
the trade, raising a strength there, which on occasion of a future 
war, might easily be poured down the Mississippi upon the 
lower country, and into the Bay of Mexico, to be used against 
Cuba, the French Islands, or Mexico itself. I mentioned your 
plan, its being approved by Sir William Johnson, and the 
readiness and ability of the gentlemen concerned to carry the 
settlement into execution, with very little expense to govern-
ment. The secretaries appeared finally to be fully convinced, 
and there remained no obstacle but the Board of Trade, which 
was to be brought over privately before the matter should be 
referred to them officially. In case of laying aside the superin-
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tendents, a provision was thought of for Sir William Johnson. 
He will be made governor of the New Colony." (Works, Vol. 5, 
pp.45-6.) 
It is not known just when Shelburne reached a decision as to 
planting settlements on the western border, but there is reason for 
suspecting that it was before this conversation and that Franklin 
was kept unaware of it. Within a fortnight he presented his long 
waited-for report to the Cabinet on a "System for the Trade and 
Management of the Indians." 22 The expenses, he said, were so 
great as to require reduction or adequate means of defraying them. 
The Stamp Act, designed for this purpose, was "too unpopular and 
unconstitutional to prove effectual;" the adequacy of the recent 
"Regulations and Duties" (was he thinking of those imposed by 
Townshend, who had died just a week before?) was doubtful. The 
plan of reduction he proposed is sufficiently shown by the questions 
he was authorized to submit to the Board of Trade and by the report 
of that body: Could the expenses of the Indian trade be safely re-
duced by turning the management back to the several provinces; 
by dispensing with the superintendents or at least curtailing their 
functions; by reducing the number of forts under imperial control 
or by turning them, also, over to the colonies; and finally whether 
by "establishing a government at Detroit and another at the Illinois 
the greater part of the expenses will not be rendered unnecessary"? 
It will be noticed that at this time Shelburne had in mind the erec-
tion of two colonies in the western country. While the matter was 
pending his attention was called to the military importance of oc-
cupying the region which the Mississippi Company had petitioned 
for in 1763, at the mouth of the Ohio, and the Secretary requested 
the Board to consider the advisability of planting a third colony in 
that region. 
The Board made its report March 7, 1768. The primary con-
cern here is its recommendation concerning the proposed new 
colonies; but it is well to note that the Board recognized that Im-
perial control of the great valley had not worked well and was very 
expensive, and it approved Lord Shelburne's suggestion for turn-
"Ill. Hist. Doc., XVI, pp. 12-21. For some reasons the questions and ac-
companying documents were not sent to the Board till October 5. The Secre-
tary's letter was essentially a skillful argument for the position taken before 
the Cabinet. Ibid. pp. 77-81. 
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ing back to the colonies the control of the Indian trade, for limiting 
the authority of the Superintendents, and for further economies 
in the military occupation. But here agreement ceased. The Board 
took a strong hostile attitude towards new inland colonies: they 
would not improve the fur trade but would prove the end of it; 
they would engender the hostility of the Indians, ever jealous of 
encroachment on their hunting grounds; they would not be a defense 
for the old colonies but would themselves stand in need of it. The 
findings of the Board were approved by the Council. And ap-
parently the promoters saw some merit in the decision. A few days 
after it was announced, Franklin calmly wrote his son: "The pur-
pose of the new colonies seems at present to be dropped, the change 
in the American administration not appearing favorable to it." 
If this conclusion of the Board could be accepted with equani-
mity, surely the argument with which it was supported could not be. 
To erect new coolnies in the interior, said the report, would be 
something new, a reversal of the policy of 1763 reserving the in-
terior as hunting-grounds for the Indians; contrary indeed, to the 
great object of colonizing North America, namely "to improve and 
extend the commerce, navigation, and manufactures of this King-
dom, upon which its strength and security depend;" by promoting 
the fisheries; by encouraging the production of raw materials to be 
exchanged for "perfect manufactures and other products of the 
realm," and for supplying provisions and lumber for the island 
colonies. Increasing population will, of course, require new lands, 
admits the Board, but these have been made available-to the north-
ward in Nova Scotia and southward in the new colonies of East 
and West Florida created by the proclamation of 1763. Moreover, 
negotiations were in progress for shifting the line of 1763 westward 
in order to allow the Middle Colonies to expand "themselves back-
wards" if and when necessary. Growth of population was thus pro-
vided for without planting settlements "above fifteen hundred miles 
from the sea," which would probably be compelled to manufacture 
for themselves. The theory and practice of British policy was 
familiar enough to the colonists, but this blunt official statement 
of the theory upon which the colonists were being "pushed around" 
for the supposed benefit of the Kingdom or some group in it, was 
an affront to self-conscious Americans of the 1760's and '70's. 
Franklin, though quiescent now was later to protest hotly against 
it when the Board was again blocking westward expansion. One 
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effect of the report of March 7, 1768 was a shift of the specula-
tive ventures on the western border to the upper Ohio country 
already covered by numerous claims to royal favor. We have 
seen that in December the Mississippi Company switched its 
petition for 2V2 million acres at the mouth of the Ohio to one for 
a like amount lying between 38 and 42 degrees of north latitude 
extending from the Alleghenies "westward to the dividing line," and 
that Dr. Arthur Lee was sent to London to act as agent for the 
Virginians. The record shows that the petition was received, re-
ferred to the Board of Trade and there two years later was 'con-
sidered," probably in the hope of finding in it grounds for opposing 
the more famous petition of Thomas Walpole and associates for 
a grant on the Ohio, at the time before the Board. 
Already, long before the fate of its Illinois venture was known, 
the Wharton group had an enterprise well under way for securing 
a large tract of land in the much coveted upper Ohio country. The 
project dated back to Pontiac's War. The traders in the Ohio coun-
try, most of them Pennsylvanians, suffered heavy losses at the hands 
of the Indians and at the close of the war a few of them appealed 
to Sir William Johnson and General Amherst for aid in securing 
indemnification from the home government. It might seem strange 
that in a general disaster in which thousands had lost property, 
life and freedom, the traders should be singled out for succor; but 
so it was. Sympathetic replies having been received from the Super-
intendent and the Commander-in-chief, a general meeting was 
called near the end of 1763 of traders who had been despoiled, in-
cluding some of those who had suffered losses in 1754, and the 
Philadelphia merchants who had made advances to active traders. 
George Croghan who was one of the "sufferers," was preparing to 
go to London on semi-official business, and to him the traders 
delegated authority to present their claims to the Board of Trade. 
He had also a private matter to place before the Board-the con-
firmation of an "unsolicited" grant of 200,000 acres of land which 
the Indians had made to him out of gratitude for his "constant 
efforts to maintain peace." To this prayer and that of the traders, 
the Board turned a deaf ear. After spending the greater part of 1764 
on his mission he returned empty-handed. 
The tarders now turned their attention to securing satisfaction 
directly from the Indians. Again they turned to Sir William J ohn-
son and again he promised support. In the spring of 1765, pur-
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suant to a request from the Board of Trade to sound out the 
Indians with respect to a new line between the colonies and their 
reservation a conference with the Six Nations was held at his home. 
He found them agreeable to the proposal and so reported to his 
superiors. At this meeting he presented the case of the traders to 
the Indians and found them willing to make reparation for the 
losses they had occasioned. The only way they could do this was 
to give the traders part of their land; and this they would do when 
the proposed new line was established. How they were brought to 
this agreement is not clear. Representatives of the two trading firms 
who had suffered most were at the conference-William Trent of 
Simons, Trent and Franks, and Samuel Wharton of Boynton, 
Wharton and Morgan and from what we know of the ways of the 
traders and of these particular men, it is safe to assume that presents 
as well as the superintendent's appeal paved the way to a decision. 
During the year George Croghan got the same kind of assurance 
from the Ohio tribes. They were sorry for the damage they had 
caused and were "not only very willing, but anxious to make repara-
tion to ... the unhappy sufferers." The only way they could do 
this was "by a Surrender of a part of their Country, which they 
would most cheerfully do, and especially of that part, which lies on 
this side of the River Ohio [on the back part of Virginia] as it was 
now of no use to them as Hunting Ground." 23 This restitution 
must wait, however, on the fixing of the new boundary line. To 
hasten this was the next care of the Traders. 
They had long to wait; for it was not till the end of 1767 that 
instructions were sent to Johnson to treat for the new line and for 
the purchase of the new lands to be surrendered to the Crown. Dr. 
Franklin discovered the cause of the long delay. In the summer 
of 1767 he received a package of letters for the ministry, written by 
collusion, thinks Alvord, calling attention to the danger of an 
Indian war because of the lawless invasion of the Indian country. 
Events were moving faster than the government. The trickle of 
population crossing the mountains before the war had increased to 
a stream since the end of the Pontiac uprising, in defiance of the 
Proclamation of 1763; they were settling upon any lands that 
caught their fancy "without leave or license." The very thing was 
•• Croghan writing from Philadelphia to B. Franklin, December 12, 1765. 
The New Regime. 60-64. 
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happening that Burke a few years later told Parliament must hap-
pen if the government persisted in its policy of "hedging in the 
population," -of keeping "as a liar for wild beasts that land which 
God, by a special charter, has given to the children of men." He de-
nounced as "neither prudent nor practicable . . . this avarice of 
desolution, this hoarding of a royal wilderness." "Stop your grants." 
he said, "and the people will occupy without grants." 
All this Lord Shelburne at least seemed to have been conscious 
of in 1767 when Franklin handed him the package of letters from 
his friends urging, in the interest of law, order and peace, the speedy 
settlement of the proposed new boundary line which had received 
Indian approval two years before. To Franklin's surprise, Shel-
burne knew nothing of Sir William's report on the subject; it had 
been lost in the Board of Trade. It was later found, however, and 
in December 1767 instructions were sent to Johnson to treat with 
the Indians for a new boundary and the cession of lands lying 
east of it. 
And so was set in motion the most important conference yet 
held with the Indians. It was called by Sir William Johnson to 
meet in September, 1768, at Fort Stanwix where Rome, New York, 
now stands. The call went out to the Six Nations, some Canadian 
tribes, and the semi-independent tribes on the Ohio in order to 
avoid a common cause of treaty violation, that not all tribes con-
cerned had given their assent. It was a long journey for some of 
the tribes and it was not till near the end of October that Sir 
William thought it wise to convene the congress formally. 
In the meanwhile important preparations had been made for 
it by the traders. William Trent and Samuel Wharton had spent 
the summer visiting various tribes renewing old acquaintances and 
making new ones; they were early at Fort Stanwix as the nations 
were gathering, looking after the interests of the traders' Company; 
and when, on October 24, the Congress was formally opened, they 
had reason to be satisfied with the results of their labors. Sir 
William's negotiations had also gone well. The new line agreed 
upon was more favorable to English interests than he had been 
instructed to secure. It ran roughly along the course of the 
Allegheny River and down the Ohio as far as the mouth of the 
Tennessee. He had been instructed to carry the line only to the 
mouth of the Great Kanawha, there to meet the line already agreed 
upon with the Southern tribes. The Indians were in a generous 
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mood. They wished to confirm the grant of 200,000 acres of land 
to George Croghan in lieu of one previously made. They wished 
also to compensate the traders for the losses inflicted in 1763 by a 
grant of land lying within the territory they proposed to cede 
to the Crown; and so they executed a deed for a tract on the Ohio 
lying roughly between the Little Kanawha and the Monogahela 
containing about 3,500,000 acres, the consideration being 85,916 
pounds, 10 shillings, 8 pence, the amount of losses suffered by the 
traders. The deed, however, was made, not directly to the tarders, 
but to the King, "to and for the only use, benefit, and behoof" of 
the traders. The Indians insisted that this sale and the Croghan 
grant be made part of the treaty; otherwise they would agree to no 
line or cession of territory. Agreement on the traders' grant was 
reached on November 3rd, and on the treaty two days later.24 
By this treaty the government had, after five years of fumbling 
with the western land question, taken the first step toward a solu-
tion of it. A new Indian line was esetablished and the King was 
now not only sovereign over but, on payment of the stipulated price 
of something over ten thousand pounds, would-be owner of the land 
of a vast territory extending from the mountains along the southern 
bank of the Ohio almost to its mouth. What now was to be the 
policy for disposing of it? The answer to that question was to be 
only slowly unfolded over the next six years. Meanwhile grants 
were authorized here and there through the royal governors, and 
one of magnificent proportions was soon under consideration by 
the ministry to be made directly by the King. But it was not till 
1774 that a plan for the orderly disposal of land, and so the orderly 
western advance of population, was adopted. Our chief concern 
is with the large grant just referred to and to that we now turn. 
The traders were well aware that Indian grants or sale to private 
persons were forbidden by the Proclamation of 1763 and must have 
had misgivings about the success of their devious method of securing 
their grant through a fictitious sale to the Crown for their "only 
use." In any case the King's confirmation would, as they then be-
lieved, be required. Soon after the treaty was signed the "Indiana 
Company" as the traders' company was now called, decided to send 
agents to London to support the "justice and reasonableness" of 
•• For the Treaty of Fort Stanwix, see Alvord, Miss. Valley, 11,61-89; Lewis, 
G. E. The Indiana Company, 35-72. 
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their cause. One of these was William Trent who had been indis-
pensable in the negotiations with the Indians; the other was Samuel 
Wharton who was to be chief spokesman for the company in Eng-
land. He went abroad with introductions to men of influence, and 
with power of attorney to act for the company. But when he ar-
rived in London early in 1769 he found that the confirmation of the 
treaty was itself in doubt. This was due to the attitude assumed 
by Lord Hillsborough, recently appointed colonial secretary and 
soon to become president of the Board of Trade. Promptly on 
receipt of the treaty he had, without consulting the council, censured 
Sir William Johnson for exceeding his authority in running the 
new Indian line along the course of the Tennessee River instead 
of the Great Kanawha; for including the grants to Croghan and to 
the traders in the treaty, and for the large price he had agreed to 
pay for the cession. The reason given for opposing the more western 
line was that it did not conform with the boundary previously 
agreed upon with the southern Indians and would rouse discontent 
among them, especially the Cherokees who were believed to have 
a better claim than the Six Nations to the land between the 
Kanawha and the Tennesse. It is to be kept in mind, however, that 
Hillsborough was consistently opposed to encroachment on the 
Indian hunting-grounds in the interest of peace and of the preserva-
tion of the fur trade, and opposed to the unrestricted western ex-
tension of settlement when allowed at all. His position on the 
boundary was overruled by the council as to the line and he was 
compelled to write Sir William a face-saving letter saying in effect 
that the boundary would stand as in the treaty; but the grant to the 
traders would not.25 
Samuel Wharton was disappointed but not dismayed by the firm 
stand taken by Hillsborough against the Indiana grant. He was, 
however, a man of many devices. By midyear 1769 he had taken ad-
vantage of the prevalent hunger for American land in London and 
had organized a company for the purpose of purchasing western 
land as a speculative enterprise. He was extraordinarily successful 
in enlisting men of influence, among them Thomas Walpole, mer-
chant-banker and member of Parliament. The petition for the pur-
•• Documents relating to the Colonial History of New York, Vol. VIII, Hills-
borough to Johnson, Jan. 4, 1769,158-163; Board of Trade to the King, April 25, 
1769, 161-166; Johnson to Hillsborough, Aug. 21, 179-184. 
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chase of 2,400,000 acres of land was, in due course, considered by 
the Board of Trade and a hearing called for December 20, 1769. 
Lord Hillsborough presided. For some reason the secretary stepped 
out of his role as the opponent of westward migration and assumed 
that of an expansionist. Why, he asked, did not the petitioners re-
quest a larger grant, large enough to form a colony back of the 
mountains? The members present promptly accepted the suggestion; 
they would be glad to buy a larger tract. Hillsborough said the sale 
of land was a treasury matter; the lords of that department were in 
session at the moment; he would inquire their pleasure as to the 
plan. In a matter of minutes he was able to report them favorable 
to it. And so was set going a project of great moment to the many 
claimants in the upper Ohio country, including the "suffering 
traders of 1763," the Ohio Company, the Mississippi Company, to 
the numerous unlawful settlers west of the mountains, and to the 
colony of Virginia; a project which by his later opposition to it, 
brought about the downfall of Lord Hillsborough. 
Events now moved swiftly. Within a week (December 27) a 
new and enlarged company was formed to consist of 72 shares and 
the boundaries of the desired territory agreed upon. They were 
ample enough and suitably chosen for a colony, estimated to em-
brace 20 million acres.26 Another week and agreement with the 
Treasury had been reached January 4, 1770, as to the price to be 
paid-IO,460 pounds, 7 shillings, 3 pence, the cost to the Empire 
of the entire cession as agreed upon at Fort Stanwix. 
Some minor obstacles were encountered by the company and it 
was not till early May that the petition of "Thomas Walpole and 
associates" was presented to the King's Council. Arthur Lee was 
pressing for action on the Mississippi Company's petition but seems 
to have got little or no official encouragement.27 Edward Montague, 
London agent for Virginia, asked for a stay of proceedings on the 
grant for the new colony until his government could be heard 
from,28 thus raising a question of considerable value to Lord Hills-
•• The boundaries are given by Alvord, Miss. Valley, II, 103. 
Of It should be remembered, however, that it was in this month of May, 
1770, that the Board, apparently looking for reasons for rejecting the Walpole 
petition, "considered" the petition of the Mississippi Company; this was the 
last official notice of it . 
•• When news of the proposed grant reached Virginia it seems not to have 
induced much action. On April 15, 1770, however, Washington wrote the 
governor that the grant "if obtained will, in my humble opinion, give a fatal 
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borough a little later. Two days before the Walpole group had 
been given its first hearing at the Board of Trade, George Mercer 
who for six years had been in London on behalf of the Ohio Com-
pany, presented a petition to that body praying it "not to make 
any grant within the limits prescribed by the Royal Instructions" 
under which the grant of 500,000 acres of land had been authorized 
to his company on conditions which it is now ready to fulfill.29 
Wharton seems to have thought this claim had some merit. Negotia-
tions were begun with Mercer which resulted in an agreement to 
merge the Ohio Company with the Walpole enterprise, the old 
company to receive two shares in the new one, now to be called 
the Grand Ohio Company. For some reason not apparent Mercer 
was also assigned one share, and he was given to understand that 
he was to be the governor of the new "province." His action had 
been taken without authority from the home members, and there 
was a long delay in reporting it to them; and, it may be added, 
a much longer delay before any action was taken by them. When 
it was taken it was in the form of a repudiation of the transaction. 
The next day after the bargain was made with Mercer the new 
company presented its petition to the council for authority to pur-
chase the desired territory on the terms already agreed upon with 
the Treasury. On May 25, 1770, it was sent to the Board of Trade 
for study and recommendations, and there it was to be lodged for 
two years. 
In view of the fact that their petition had been acted upon 
favorably by two important government agencies, the members of 
the Grand Ohio Company seem warranted in expecting the Board 
of Trade to act promptly. That they did not was due to the in-
fluence of Lord Hillsborough, Colonial Secretary, and the pro-
poser of the new colony. Sensing that the sale of the territory was 
in high favor, he tried first to induce other officers to sit in with the 
Board and thus share the responsibility for decisions reached on so 
important a question. Another more serviceable reason for delay 
was the desire to protect the interests of Virginia. That he was 
blow to the interests of this country." This did not prevent him from trying 
later to buy shares in the new company. On Nov. 24, 1770, he wrote George 
Croghan offering to buy his share and asking the price. A year later he wrote 
George Mercer, inquiring the price of shares in London. Writings III. 9, 26, and 
72 . 
•• Kenneth P. Bailey. The Ohio Company of Virginia, Appendix 317. 
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able to postpone action so long is the more remarkable when the 
character of the membership of the company is conisdered. The 
list of members30 marks it as more English than American; Samuel 
Wharton in his search for men of "influence" had done well. At 
the head of the list stands the name of the Earl of Hertford, who 
as Lord Chamberlain was supposed to have much influence with 
the King. There was Lord Camden, the Lord Chancellor "who,"' 
says Alvord, "took shares in the company and at every crisis was a 
valued adviser." Two other members of the higher nobility held 
shares though their names do not appear in the list; Lord Rochford 
and the Earl of Gower, both members of the Privy Council. Of 
the commonalty there was George Grenville of Stamp Act fame 
whose share, after his death, was held by his brother, Earl Temple; 
Thomas Bradshaw, Under-Secretary of the Treasury, who was credit-
ed at the time with having carried "the land company through its 
early stages" (Alvord II. 98); there was of course the name of 
Thomas Walpole whose political and financial standing has already 
been noted; and it was believed that other names in the list were 
covers for men high in official life. 
Nor were the American members wanting in weight. There was 
Sir William Johnson, much trusted and highly honored appointee 
of the Crown who was in constant communication with the com-
manding General on this side and the colonial office in London; 
there were the two Franklins, father and son, both appointees of 
the Crown, the one as assistant postmaster general in America, the 
other as royal governor of New Jersey; and Samuel Wharton who 
had business connections in London and whose influence there is 
shown by the character of the men he enlisted in his enterprise. 
The name of the Indiana Company whose affairs took him to Lon-
don does not appear on the list; but at the reorganization at which 
the elder Franklin presided, at the meeting of December 27, 1769, 
it was "unanimously agreed to reserve to the Indiana Company and 
to George Croghan their respective grants." 31 In addition to this 
the name of Croghan appears on the list as a member in his own 
right as does that of Samuel Wharton, his father, and each of three 
brothers. 
30 Alvord, Miss. Valley, II, 98. 
11 Lewis, The Indiana Company, 92. 
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In spite of this array of men of "influence," Lord Hillsborough 
was able to defer action on the petition for many months. It was 
only when the King let it be known that he was interested to know 
when a report on the new colony could be expected that the Board 
acted. Its report on the Walpole petition was sent to the Council 
April 15, 1772. As must have been expected, the report recom-
mended that the prayer of the memorialists be denied. The support-
ing argument was much the same as that used in 1768 against erect-
ing colonies in the Illinois country. Indeed, many paragraphs of 
the earlier report were lifted verbatim from it for use in the present 
one. In accord with established colonial policy, it ran, the proclama-
tion line of 1763 had set the limit of western settlement "at such a 
distance from the seacoast, as that all settlements should lie within 
reach of the trade and commerce of this Kingdom;" and notwith-
standing that the Fort Stanwix line had reduced the hunting 
grounds of the Indians it did not enlarge the area in which settle-
ments could be made, for the prohibition against settlement west 
of the 1763 line remained unchanged. That in fact was true, and 
Hillsborough, speaking for the Board, would have the temporary 
prohibition of that year made permanent. 
One can well imagine that when Wharton saw the report he 
rubbed his hands in glee and said: "Now hath the Lord delivered 
him into mine hands." Arguments that had weight as against 
planting colonies on the Mississippi in 1768, had little or no 
relevancy as against the Vandalia Colony in 1772 where there 
were already some 30,000 settlers in active commercial communica-
tion with the seaboard; and when on July 1, the council, at the 
instance of Lord Gower, permitted the petitioners to state their 
case, Wharton took full advantage of the many weaknesses in Hills-
borough's position. His Observations on the Foregoing Report,82 
supplemented by his ready response to questions asked, left little 
of merit in the argument in the report. The Council apparently 
took little time in reaching a decision in the matter. Contrary to 
the Secretary's recommendation it advised the King to grant the 
petition, and directed the Board of Trade to prepare a form of 
•• Writings of Benjamin Franklin, 5:467-478 for the Report; Obseroations 
on the Foregoing Report, 479 If. This pamphlet long believed to be by Frank-
lin was actually written by Wharton. Alvord, Miss. Valley, 2:132n. See also Frank-
lin's Writings, 5:410. . 
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government for the new colony. Hillsborough had declared that 
rather than work out the details for making effective such a grant 
he would resign. In August he reluctantly gave up his office of 
Colonial Secretary and retired from the cabinet. 
Whether the decision of the Council was due to Wharton's 
masterly presentation of the petitioners' case; to the self-interest of 
council members Gower and Rochford; to a recognition of the 
colony as in the national interest; or to the "exigencies of British 
politics" at the moment, who can tell? It seems probably that they 
each had some part in determining the Council's action. Alvord's 
analysis of the situation is of special importance, however, to our 
inquiry. He points out that just at this time there was a fractional 
conspiracy on foot to bring about the fall of the North ministry. 
The scheme was to humiliate the Colonial Secretary, the "best and 
firmest friend of North," force him to resign, and so bring about 
the downfall of the prime minister. This factional scheming was 
the easier and safer because of the general dislike of Hillsborough 
by his fellow ministers, and because the King was believed to be 
tired of the Secretary and "his administration which had weakened 
the affection and respect of the colonies for a royal government." 
The conspiracy failed of its main purpose; North treated the 
resignation as purely voluntary and remained in office-remained 
to inject, as it turned out, the affairs of the East India Company 
into the already delicate American situation. 
Lord Dartmouth succeeded Hillsborough as Colonial Secretary 
and President of the Board of Trade. His appointment was alto-
gether to the liking of the Walpole associates. His attitude toward 
the colonies was friendly, he was known to be in favor of westward 
expansion, and was himself the owner of 40,000 acres of land in 
West Florida. Indeed, according to Alvord, "he had been selected 
with the avowed purpose of forwarding the enterprise on the upper 
Ohio." (Miss. Val. II, 149). The Board received the petition the 
day Dartmouth took office with instructions to report on such 
reservations in the grant as seemed advisable, and to prepare a 
constitution for the new colony soon to be called Vandalia. 
The Board of Trade proceded deliberately and it was not till 
May of 1773 that it reported to the Council. There were reasons 
for the delay. The "opposition" was performing its function of 
opposing whatever the government proposed; General Gage writing 
from New York questioned the wisdom of western settlement on 
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the usual anti-expansionist grounds and he was soon in London 
where he "was thought to have great influence;" there was an under-
current of hostile opinion abroad in the city, partly because so many 
public officials were due to become beneficiaries of the grant as to 
give the whole enterprise the appearance of a "job." Moreover, the 
voice of Virginia was being heard in firmer tones through its new 
governor, Lord Dunmore. Nevertheless, the Board, after almost a 
year, made its report to the Council on May 6, 1773. 
Some important reservations in the grant were recommended. 
All legal settlements on the grant prior to the day negotiations 
were begun with the Treasury were to be respected. Reservation was 
made of the 200,000 acres promised under the Dinwiddie proclama-
tion of 1754. Instead of the purchase price being paid by install-
ments over five years the whole was to be paid the day the title 
was passed; and it was stipulated that the proprietors were to pay 
the expense of setting up and maintaining the conony. The 
boundaries of the colony were extended beyond those prayed for in 
the petition, though apparently without changing the area of the 
grant. The western boundary was to follow the course of the 
Kentucky River, and another slice was taken of Virginia territory 
by a shift of the southern boundary, which, as Alvord points out, 
cut that colony off from contact with the West. 
The Council, on receiving the report, referred it to a special 
committee consisting of Lords Gower and Rochford, both members 
of the company, and Lord Dartmouth. It was not expected that such 
a committee would reach any conclusions adverse to the interests of 
the Grand Ohio Company. It did not. Early in July the council 
sent the petition to the Attorney General and the Solicitor General 
for a legal check-up with instructions to prepare the grant in form 
for the King's signature. The law officers found plenty to check. 
On one pretext or another, they retained the papers until the 
King was in a fair way to having no land in the colonies to grant. 
Alvord has tried to ferret out, without much success it must be 
said, the political influences back of the law officers' "masterly in-
activity." All we can safely say is that they "stalled." 
During the year 1773, the ministry decided upon two measures 
which proved to be disturbers of the relative quiet prevailing at the 
time in the colonies. One had to do with a new method of dispos-
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ing of crown lands to be discussed presently; the other was a plan 
for aiding the East Indian Company in finding an enlarged market 
for its tea in the colonies. The practical working of this second 
measure is a familiar story and need not detain us. When Thomas 
Wharton saw the extremes to which the Americans went in their 
opposition to landing the tea, he feared a political reaction in 
London injurious to colonial interests including the enterprise 
on the upper Ohio, and he wrote his brother Samuel: "I ... most 
ardently wish thou may be in possession of the grant, before the 
arrival of full accounts respecting the conduct of the Americans 
touching the tea, as I fear it will strengthen our enemies to oppose 
the completion thereof." 33 It may well have done so. The "Blooms-
bury Gang," as the followers of Lord Bedford were called, a faction 
always hostile to the colonies, joined in the general clamor for laws 
that would put the Americans in their proper place. They had 
supported the two tax laws and opposed their repeal. It was at their 
insistence that the Tea Tax was retained and that the Declaratory 
Act was passed. The tea affair gave the occasion for invoking that 
Act. There followed logically enough the retaliatory acts, the first 
Continental Congress, and the second Congress. In the summer 
of 1774 Wharton and Walpole sent a memorial to the King praying 
for the early completion of the grant. What, if any action was 
taken on the memorial I do not know; but in Mayor June, 1775, 
two years after receiving the papers, the attorney general and the 
solicitor general returned the grant ready for the King's signature. 
It was never signed; hostilities had begun. 
REFORM OF THE LAND SYSTEM, 1774 
While the Walpole grant was pending, the ministry for the first 
time gave serious thought to the reform of the imperial land policy. 
The reform so far as it went at this time had to do mainly with 
changes in the terms and method of disposing of crown lands. Be-
fore considering these changes, it will be convenient to take a look 
at the system which had grown up during a century and a half. 
You will recall that when the London Company was dispossessed 
of Virginia in the 1620's, the government took over with the land 
certain methods of disposal which had recently been adopted by 
the company. The company was land-rich; land was the cheap 
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factor of production and it was freely used to secure the scarce 
factor, labor. Under the "reform" administration of Sir Edwin 
Sandys in 1619, the company put in operation a five year plan for 
recruiting the colony. Shortly before it had declared its first 
"dividend" in land to the "old adventurers," that is to share-
holders and to those who had adventured their persons in the 
colony, and a second division or dividend in land was promised 
"when the first shall be sufficiently peopled." To further encourage 
the peopling of the colony the old members were now promised 
the old adventurers' 50 acres for each person transported to Virginia 
before mid-summer, 1625, and as much more when the first allot-
ment should be peopled. All these grants were to be in absolute 
ownership. New subscribers before this date were promised divi-
dends the same as the old adventurers, except that grants made on 
the basis of persons transported were to be subject to an annual 
rent of 12 pence per 50 acres. "Planters," that is settlers going out 
at their own expense, were promised 50 acres each in his own right 
at the first division, and, this "being peopled," the same at the 
second division. They too, were allowed 50 acres for each person 
they transported, subject, of course, to the 12 pence rent. Thus 
appeared in America this vestige of feudalism, the "quit-rent." 
The plan, together with certain other reforms set in operation 
by Sandys, worked well. From 1607 to 1618 about 1800 persons had 
gone to reside in the colony; from 1619 to 1624 the number was 
4,749. (Brown, The First Republic, 285, 612). The practice of 
granting land for "head-rights" was adopted by the Crown, and 
with modifications, was continued to the eve of the Revolution. It 
fitted in with the indented servant system by which the colonies 
were in large part peopled. 
In the quit-rents the Crown had a long established source of 
revenue which though unquestioned, was, nevertheless a constant 
source of friction-over the time and place of collection, the medium 
of payment, and the use to which the revenue was put. Because of 
lax administration, official venality, and dishonest land owners, 
the rents were usually in arrears and the yield disappointingly 
small. Efforts to improve the administration had generally been 
futile. Two devices for escaping payment may be mentioned. One 
grew out of the method of surveying and designating boundaries of 
grants, which was so crude that errors in calculating acreages might 
honestly be made. But the errors were so great in some cases, 
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probably in many, as to indicate fraud. Bond, in his Quit Rent 
System, cites, as an example, a 1000 acre grant surveyed and so 
listed on the rent-roll; a re-survey showed there were 5,000 acres in 
the track. Fitzpatrick tells of a grant of 13,986 acres in the Illinois 
country, which was found later to contain 30,000 acres. Another 
method of evasion was described by Governor DinwiddIe. Grantees 
would delay for long periods taking out their patents and thus avoid 
placing their land on the tax roll. He declared in 1754, that a 
million acres in Virginia were thus escaping rent payments. Bond 
found three tracts in New York of perhaps more than a million 
acres each which paid only a nominal rent. 
If these frauds could be practiced in the settled regions, what a 
field for similar frauds was opened when grants began to be made 
beyond the mountains! Lord Shelburne when he became secretary 
of state, understood the situation and proposed to do something 
about it. As already noted, one of the chief concerns of every 
ministry of the period was to find ways of reducing imperial expenses 
in the colonies, or increasing the revenue for them or both. Shel-
burne shared this concern and as already pointed out he was con-
sistently opposed to all tax proposals. The most obvious way to 
increase the revenue, he wrote General Gage, was "by taking care 
of the quit-rents and by turning the grants of lands to real benefit." 
The implication here is, that he would charge a price for the King's 
land in place of the usual nominal sum paid. Thus he thought an 
"American fund to defray American expenses in part or in whole," 
could be provided.34 Accordingly, in the year of the repeal of the 
Stamp Act, he set afoot an inquiry into all aspects of land grants 
and rents. "Nothing can be more reasonable than that the proprie-
tors of large tracks ... should either pay their quit-rents punctually 
for the time to come, or relinquish their grant in favor of those 
who will." He sought information regarding the manner of making 
grants with a view to future policy, "particularly in the new and 
conquered provinces," such as "would lighten the burden which 
lies upon the Mother Country." Before the inquiry was completed, 
Shelburne was out of power and colonial affairs were dominated 
by Lord Hillsborough whose chief concern in the new provinces 
was to reserve them as hunting-grounds; an idea he held to the day 
•• Fitzmaurice, Life of Lord Shelburne, I, pp. 305-7. 
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he was over-ruled by the Council in the Walpole matter and had 
to resign. 
Mention has been made of a land reform measure set on foot in 
1773. Whether it grew out of a belated recognition of the merit 
in Shelburne's idea of "turning the grants of lands to a real benefit;" 
or was suggested by the unexpected and novel offer of the Walpole 
associates to pay a substantial price for their grant; or, whether it 
came as a happy thought to some one that western lands so eagerly 
sought after had a market value, I do not know. At any rate the 
Board of Trade was instructed to bring in a report on the subject, 
and in April, 1773, the colonial governors were instructed to re-
frain from passing any patents or issuing any permits of survey, 
until the King's pleasure was known, on pain of dismissal. 
The King's pleasure was made known in his instructions to the 
Royal Governors on February 3, 1774.35 All previous instructions 
relating to the laying out and granting of lands were revoked and 
annulled. The governor, surveyor general, secretary, and receiver 
general of quit-rents, in each province were directed to layoff in 
districts such lands as it would be "most advantageous to the public 
interest and welfare" to have settled and improved. They were 
directed to "cause actual surveys" to be made of lots containing 
not more than 1,000, and not less than 100 acres, and these were 
to be numbered and a map made for the district. The lands thus 
laid off were to be offered for sale at a time and place fixed by the 
officers named and sold to the "best bidder," but only after being 
duly advertised for four months, and at a price not less than six 
pence sterling per acre, and reserving an annual quit-rent of one 
half penny sterling per acre; and there was a reservation not of the 
usual royal fifth, but of all mines of gold, silver, and precious 
stones." 36 
35 Documents Relating to the Colonial History ot New York, VIII, 409-413; 
S. E. Morison, Documents Relating to the American Revolution, 97-98. 
S. Note that the old rate was 10 shillings per 100 acres, and 2 shillings quit 
rents per 100 acres in Virginia. The new rates figure out a price of 50 shillings, 
and a quit-rent of 4 shillings per hundred acres, not in tobacco or currency but 
in sterling. The new regulations annulled the method of acquiring land by 
"head-rights." But George Mason would not have it so. In June, 1774, he 
petitioned the governor and Council of Virginia for permission to take up land 
"upon the western waters" on the presentation of certificates of "importation 
rights" he had bought at great expense. He argued that this method of acquir-
ing land had been authorized by the Charter of 1609 and had been reaffirmed by 
Charles II; that "Titles to a great part of the lands of this Colony have been 
40 BRITISH LAND POLICY AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 
This new land policy must have been pleasing to Lord Shel-
burne. Provision was at last made for "turning the grants of land 
to real benefit." The logical next step would be to collect the quit-
rents due by the terms of previous grants; and the English temper 
at the time was such that the long over-due reform of that system 
might be expected to follow.37 And so would be created an "Ameri-
can fund for the American colonies" from sources to which the 
Crown had an unquestioned right. 
Unquestioned till this fateful year of 1774. When it became 
certain that a continental congress would convene to take counsel 
concerning "many unwarrantable encroachments and usurpations 
of Parliament," Thomas Jefferson prepared what he hoped would 
become the instructions to the Virginia delegates to that meeting. 
Being regarded as too bold for the occasion, they were not so used, 
but were later printed under the title, A Summary View of the 
Rights of British America. He later, in his Autobiography, ad-
mitted that the ideas in the document were a leap too far ahead-
two years ahead, as events proved. We may leave aside his de-
nunciation of the navigation acts and the recent laws which had 
roused the colonies to united action except to note that he denounc-
granted on this basis; and that the King 'ever observant of the Law' could not 
have intended that his regulations should 'affect land due ... under the royal 
charter:" Dunmore had already been rebuked by Lord Dartmouth for ex-
ceeding his authority in making grants and no action was taken at this time. 
Under a law drafted by Jefferson and Mason in 1779. the old terms for acquir-
ing land were restored including purchase with head rights. Papers of Thomas 
Jefferson, Vol. I, 112-115. Princeton. 
87 I have come upon no documentary evidence that the ministry contemplated 
such a step at the time; nor have I found signs of alarm in Virginia over the 
probability that it would be taken. It should be remembered. however. that Lord 
Shelburne in his letter to Gage in 1766 had said that if land owners did not 
pay the rent due the Crown. they ought to surrender ~heir holdings to some-
one who would; and that one of the grievances of Jefferson in the Summary View 
was that under a law of George II, land in the colonies could be seized for debt. 
One wonders if, in this year, 1774, when the ministry for the first time turned 
seriously to the land for revenue, Jefferson may not have had in mind the 
prospect of a tightening up of the administration, re-surveys, and the possible 
seizure of land to satisfy debts due to the Crown. A strict administration of the 
old rents would affect adversely more Virginians probably than the doubling of 
the rent in new grants beyond the mountains. Even in New England where 
there were no quit-rents there seems to have been fear they might be imposed. 
"Hitherto many of the Colonists have been free from quit-rents; but if the 
breath of a British House of Commons can originate an Act for taking away 
all our money, our lands will go next or be subject to rack rents." (Boston 
Town Meeting. November 1772.) 
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ed them not merely because of the injury they inflicted. "The true 
ground" he said, "on which we declare these acts void is, that the 
British parliament has no right to exercise its authority over us." 
Our present interest in the Summary View lies in the conception 
of British land policy held by Jefferson. At three different points, 
he discusses as many aspects of the subject: 
1. Claiming the same rights and immunities for Americans as 
were enjoyed by Englishmen, he protests against an Act passed dur-
ing the reign of George II "by which American lands are made 
subject to the demands of British creditors while their own lands 
remained unanswerable for their debts." This law was passed no 
doubt as an aid to British creditors suing for the collection of 
private mercantile debts; but, as Bond points out, distraint was 
about the only means the government had for the collection of 
arrears in quit-rents. It seems to have been used sparingly if at all. 
2. Jefferson's second point had to do with the arbitrary dismem-
berment, by the Stuart princes, of "this country which had been 
acquired by the lives and labor of individual adventurers," parting 
it out and distributing it to favorites and followers of their fortunes, 
and erecting them into distinct and independent governments. This 
was peculiarly a Virginia grievance. In this way had Virginia been 
"parted" and Maryland "erected." In this way was it now proposed 
to set up the Vandalia government; in this way all that part of 
Virginia north of the Ohio it was now proposed to attach to another 
colony.3s But, says Jefferson, it is believed that those acts of Stuart 
despotism "his Majesty's prudence and understanding will prevent 
him from imitating at this day; as no exercise of such power of 
dividing and dismembering a country, has ever occurred in his 
Majesty's realm 6f England though now of very ancient standing; 
nor could it be justified or acquiesced under there, or in any part 
of his Majesty's empire." 
3. Jefferson would have the delegates "remind the King of an 
error which at a very early period had crept in as to the nature of 
our land holding. The error had to do with the ownership and 
disposal of the soil. It had long been held that "all land in Eng-
land was held either mediately or immediately of the Crown." The 
idea was borrowed from those holdings which were truly feudal; 
.S The Walpole grant, and the Quebec Act were both pending when Jeffer-
son wrote, The Quebec Act passed the Lords June 17, 1774, signed June 22. 
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that is had been surrendered to the King at the time of the Con-
quest and by him "granted out subject to feudal duties." This 
happened to a large part of the land of the kingdom. But much 
was left in the hands of Saxons who "held their lands as they did 
their personal property, in absolute dominion, disencumbered with 
any superior." These lands were by law made liable to military 
duties as were the feuds; but they were never surrendered to a 
King, "they were never derived from his grants, and therefore not 
holden of him." These lands, Jefferson held, still form the basis 
or groundwork of the Common law, to prevail wherever the excep-
tion (the feuds) have not been taken. They prevail in this country. 
America was not conquered by William the Norman, nor its lands 
surrendered to him or to any of his successors; the tenure there is 
allodial. But the early settlers were farmers, not lawyers, and they 
accepted grants on the "fictitious principle that all lands belong 
originally to the King." As long as grants were made for small sums 
and rents were reasonable, there "was no inducement to arrest the 
error ... but his majesty has lately taken it upon himself to ad-
vance the terms of purchase and of holding to the double of what 
they were; by which means the acquisition of lands being rendered 
difficult, the population of our country is likely to be checked." 
It is time, therefore, for us to lay this matter before his Majesty, and 
to declare that he has no right to grant lands of himself. It would 
seem to follow, if he had no right to grant, he had no right to 
collect quit-rents. 
So far as I can learn Virginia was the only colony in which the 
British land policy was put forward as a "grievance" in the revolu-
tionary movement, and there it did not gain official recognition. 
It was not mentioned in the Declarations and Resolves of the first 
Continental Congress, but it appears in the Declaration of In-
dependence: 
"He has endeavored to prevent the population of these States; 
for that purpose obstructing the laws for Naturalization of For-
eigners, refusing to pass others to encourage their migration hither, 
and by raising the conditions of new appropriations of land." 
(Italics supplied.) 
The Quebec Act, however, furnished ample grounds for com-
plaint against the government's land policy. Here was an instance 
of that "parting" the territory of one government and attaching it 
to another which Jefferson thought his majesty's prudence would 
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keep him from consummating. But it was not a good point to raise 
in the Declaration; for there were men in the Congress and through-
out the country who scouted Virginia's claim to the region north 
of the Ohio. His complaint was given a political turn-that the Act 
abolishes the free system of English laws in Canada, establishing an 
arbitrary government there and "extending its boundaries so as to 
render it at once an example and fit instrument for introducing the 
same absolute rule into these colonies." 
This idea was not of American origin; it was voiced in Parlia-
ment during the debate by men of such character that they cannot 
be regarded as mere mouthpieces of the opposition. The Quebec 
Act has long been grouped in our school books with the coercive 
acts of 1774, and not unnaturally so in view of its time relationship 
to the whole batch of legislation of that year. The government at 
the time and historians ever since have denied any punitive intent, 
none more convincingly than Reginald Coupland in his The Quebec 
Act. Oxford. 1925. He points out that this long over-due measure 
had been in preparation long before the occasion for retaliation 
arose; that the religious toleration given the Catholics was in ac-
cord with the treaty and was anyway justified by its own merit; 
that the French population were unfitted for and did not want 
representative government; and that the continuance of the French 
Civil law without trial by jury was both wise, and under the cir-
cumstances, necessary. It was these provisions that roused most 
criticism at home and among the English and Scotch in Canada who 
had come in to take over the French fur trade. But in addition to 
these abhorrent provisions, the Americans found their pride injured 
and their political and economic interests ignored by the extension 
of the Province southward to the Ohio. 
It has been contended that the colonies had no ground for com-
plaint since the Act guaranteed the integrity of their boundaries and 
the government had steadily been vacating Indian claims and open-
ing them to occupation. This is true in one notable case north of 
the Ohio and more notably true in the South; but even there much 
of the occupation had been lawless and patents were secured through 
the weakness or the collusion of royal officials. North of the river 
the ban at the Proclamation line continued and was sometimes 
violated by the speculators as in the case of the Wabash enterprise 
and by settlers in the upper Ohio region. 
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The colonists may be pardoned for not taking the assurance given 
in the Act at its face value. There was no such guarantee in it as 
it passed the Lords. Debate on it began in the Commons on May 
26. On May 31, Thomas Penn presented a petition there "against 
the boundary provisions of the Bill," although that of Pennsylvania 
had, it seems, been adequately safeguarded. It was probably this 
petition that led the Commons to adopt amendments, later agreed 
to in the other chamber, providing that nothing in the Act should 
"affect the Boundaries of any other Colonies"; and further that 
nothing in it should be construed to alter "any Right, or Possession 
derived under any Grant ... or to Lands within the said Province, 
or the Provinces thereto adjoining." This seems reassuring, but 
it is not strange that the Atlantic colonies which for a hundred or 
a hundred and fifty years had been nursing the idea of sea-ta-sea 
charter grants, were not impressed, in view of the unquestioned 
purpose of the Act to establish a civil government from Quebec 
over their hinterland. It is not necessary for us to pass judgment 
upon the validity of their "claims" and "rights" beyond the moun-
tains. Our concern is with the causes, reasons, which impelled loyal 
subjects, especially Virginians, to become rebels. Coupland may 
be right in saying that the Revolution would have occurred had 
there been no Quebec Act; but there can be no question that it 
was a contributing factor. 
Regardless of what, if any, safeguard was really given by the 
"saving clause" of the Act, there were provisions in and with it 
affecting the material interests of an increasing number of Ameri-
cans, speculators, traders and settlers alike, whose faces were turned 
toward the west. Notwithstanding the failure of the imperial con-
trol set up in 1763 for the whole Mississippi Valley, the Act re-
affirmed that policy for the Northwest. This was done with the 
sincere purpose, doubtless, of protecting the interests of the Indians; 
and we may be certain for the protection of England's economic in-
terests. Even before the Act went into effect the discredited rules 
of 1764 for regulating the Indian trade were re-established there 
and made a part of the law of the land,39 to be administered of 
.8 Through the instructions sent by Lord Dartmouth to Governor Carleton, 
January 3, 1775. Documents Relating the Constitutional History of Camzda, 
614-620. The regulations may also be found in New York Colonial Documents, 
6:903, and in Illinois Historical Collections, 10:273 If. 
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course from Quebec. Likewise, if and when districts were opened 
for occupation, surveyed, and offered for sale, under the new land 
instructions of 1774, it would be done by the King's officers at 
Quebec, far removed from the influence of the most likely pur-
chasers. It is little wonder, therefore, that the land-minded Richard 
Henry Lee regarded the Quebec Act as the most intolerable of the 
Intolerable Acts. 
All this, however, was borrowing trouble. On June 7, 1775, 
Dartmouth wrote Carleton: "I have also the satisfaction to acquaint 
you, that an Account published here for a Skirmish between the 
King's Troops and the Provincials in the neighborhood of Boston 
.. _ has had no other effect than to increase that Indignation, which 
every Friend to Government feels for the Insult offered the Con-
stitution, in the rebellious Resistance to the Authority of Parlia-
ment by the People of North America." 
With the Declaration of Independence, the western question 
which had so long bedeviled the ministry, became an American 
question, whether for the States or the central government remained 
to be decided. As everyone knows the decision was in favor of the 
central government-a price paid by the "landed" states for union 
under the Articles. The agreement to surrender the State claims in 
the west was reached in 1781. It was not till 1784 that the Congress 
passed its great land ordinance, and not till 1787 that the greater 
ordinance for governing the Northwest Territory was enacted. In 
the meantime the speculators and the home seekers were having 
pretty much their own way in the West. South of the Ohio, Vir-
ginia successfully contested the claim of Richard Henderson to a 
part of Kentucky. North of the Ohio, Governor Patrick Henry 
strengthened the State's Charter claim by furnishing George Rogers 
Clark with men and money for his so-called "Conquest of the North-
west," while at the same time pleading inability to supply the State's 
quota of men and funds for an expedition planned by the Con-
gress in the same region. In 1779, under a law drafted by Jefferson 
and Mason, the State opened a land office and, disregarding the 
protest of the Congress against such action while the question of 
jurisdiction was pending, began granting lands west of the moun-
tains at the old Virginia rates. By the close of the Revolution some 
4000 grants had been made aggregating more than a million and 
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a quarter acres, 80 per cent of it going to Virginians,40 10,000 acres 
going to Patrick Henry. 
The transfer of state claims to the central government was not 
effected without a good deal of bargaining and delay. Some con-
cessions were made especially to Virginia and to Connecticut. It 
was not completed till 1805. By that time, under the rule of un-
restricted migration, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Ohio had become 
populous enough to be admitted into the Union as states. One 
wonders what, in the face of this "general inclination to settle-
ment," as Shelburne called it, would have been the outcome of 
England's renewed attempt to regulate the westward movement 
under the Instructions of 1774. 
What, now, shall we say in answer to Alvord's question: Did 
England like France lose an empire by trying to confine the colonists 
between the Alleghenies and the sea? Or, put in another way: Was 
England's policy with respect to the Mississippi Valley a determining 
factor in bringing about the revolt of the colonies? Your economic 
determinist could make a plausible argument that it was. He 
could assume (and would not be far wrong) that Virginia was 
necessary to a successful revolt; that Virginia's ties to the mother 
country were closer and apparently more enduring than those of 
any other colony, and that some special reason must be found to 
explain why this most trusted and loyal colony joined with the 
constitutionally non-conformist colonies at the north, and, indeed, 
took a leading part in the revolution. He could point out that 
Virginia had such a grievance in Great Britain's western policy. 
He could show that no sooner had the French barrier been removed 
than the King's proclamation set up a legal barrier-staying the 
"Course of Empire"; that the restriction came to be felt in all the 
colonies, but most in Virginia, first by her speculators, later by 
'0 Isaac S. Harrell. Loyalism in Virginia, pp. 18-22. The land law of 1779 
criticized as belying .Jefferson's professed interest in disposing of the western 
lands to those who would occupy and use them thus assuring more equal 
distribution of ownership; this on the ground that million acre tracts were 
later acquired in the region covered by the law. The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, 
Vol. 2, 133, prints the draft as prepared by Jefferson and Mason, with copious 
notes. It giVeS every indication of being designed to promote small holdings. 
In the course of its passage the bill underwent many changes in the interest 
of the land companies and other speculators. The bill and the law provided 
for purchases with "importation-rights" in which Mason was much interested. 
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h()~e-seekers; that her speculators were men of vision, posilioQ.. and 
influence but their petitions for land were treated with scant cour-
tesy, lmd that of the Mississippi Company was simply ignored. The 
Ohio Company's London agents during five or six years of effort 
could never get a hearing on the company's request for a re-
affirmation of its grant or for remuneration for the destruction of 
its property by the King's army. And yet the King's officers ac-
quiesced in, indeed promoted, the Indiana grant to the "suffering 
traders" of Pennsylvania, to be carved out of Virginia territory. 
This was in 1768. Two years later the King gave his assent to the 
sale of 20 or 30 million acres of Virginia territory to a company of 
Pennsylvanians and land-hungry Britons high in official life, and 
to the erection of an independent colony there, with boundaries 
so fixed that the "old Dominion" was cut off from all contact with 
the West. And finally, the Quebec Act put an end to her claims 
north of the Ohio. 
Your economic determinist could go on to show that it was a 
Virginian who first questioned publicly the King's ownership of 
unappropriated lands; it was a Virginian who introduced in the 
Continental Congress at the behest of an extra-legal convention at 
Williamsburg, the resolution of June 7, 1776, declaring that these 
colonies are and of right ought to be free and independent states; 
it was a Virginian who drafted the formal Declaration adopted a 
month later; and it was a Virginian who was placed at the head 
of the army. All this is true; and it is also true that all the men 
named and many more had a deep interest in England's manage-
ment of the great inland region at their back door. 
But, while the King was doubtless right in saying tha.t Hills-
borough's administration of the West "had weakened the alIection 
and respect of the colonies for a royal government," it does not 
speU Qut the answer implied in Alford's question. That would be 
too simple an answer to a complex problem. The "speculators," 
influential as they were, were too few in number to carry their own 
colony with them on the question of opening the West to exploita-
tion. There were many men of influence who were opposed or 
luke warm on that issue. These, the speculators, and people 
throughout the colonies, had other economic grievances, if we must 
have "economic causes of the Revolution." It was Patrick Henry, 
a western land speculator later if not at the time, who in 1765 
warned the King that Charles I had his Cromwell. The Virginians 
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entered into a non-importation agreement in protest against the 
Townshend act in its amended form retaining the tax on tea and 
into the Continental Association of 1774; most of the colonists felt 
themselves injured by parliamentary interference with their paper 
currency designed as they knew to repair their loss of specie caused 
by British commercial regulation, but designed, it was currently 
believed in England, to cheat their creditors on that side_ Out of 
deference to those who in our own time hold latitudinarian views 
concerning "property," who think it less noble to contend for 
property rights than to contend for personal and political rights, 
it may be said that there were plenty of violations of both these 
classes of rights. One theme that ran through all the controversy 
was the right to be treated as Englishmen; they were consistently 
treated as colonials-as underlings. John Adams even in his old 
age could not think of the treatment of the Virginians during the 
French and Indian War without growing red in the face with in-
dignation. Each colony had a legislature but its enactments were 
regularly suspended till the pleasure of the King was made known; 
and at any moment, on the least sign of protest against regulations 
imposed upon them, the members could be, and often were, sent 
home like naughty school boys. It is little wonder that they began 
to inquire into the source of the authority exercised over them. 
"Can anyone reason be given," asked Jefferson, "why 160,000 elec-
tors in the island of Great Britain should give law to four million 
in these states .... " It was not, he said, because of the injury 
wrought by the acts of trade and navigation that we protest against 
them. "The true ground on which we declare these acts void is 
that the British parliament has no right to exercise authority over 
us. . . . The exercise of free trade with other parts of the world 
[belonged to them] as of natural right." 
In arriving at these revolutionary conclusions the colonists were 
guided by the prevailing philosophy of the time. Where the positive 
law was against them, they appealed to a higher law-"natural 
law." The "rights" contended for in the Declaration and Resolves 
of 1774 were theirs "by the immutable laws of nature, the principles 
of the English Constitution, and our several charters or compacts." 
George Mason leaned heavily on the doctrine in the Virginia bill 
of rights: "All men are by nature equally free and independent 
and have certain inherent rights of which, when they enter into a 
state of society, they cannot by any compact divest their posterity." 
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One will not go far in the writings of the period without coming 
upon variants of these terms; and he will not, I think, be able to 
understand and appraise the movement for separation without some 
knowledge of the philosophy back of them. 
Carl Becker, more than most American historians, appreciated 
this and in his Declaration of Independence, dealt with the subject 
at some length. "That there is a 'natural order' in the world," he 
says, "explicitly designed by God for the guidance of mankind; 
that the 'laws' of this natural order may be discovered by reason; 
that these laws so discovered furnish a reliable and immutable 
standard for testing the ideas, the conduct, and the institutions of 
men-these were the accepted premises, the preconceptions, of most 
eighteenth-century thinking, not only in America but also in Eng-
land and France." These views were held by jurists, by philosophers, 
by theologians, and by the common man. Blacktone stated the 
central doctrine in no uncertain terms: "This law of nature," he 
says, "being coeval with man and dictated by God himself, is 
superior to any other; no human laws are of any validity if con-
trary to this; and such of them as are valid derive their force and 
authority from this origin." 
Such a doctrine is a ready-made instrument of revolution. It 
was, indeed, elaborated by John Locke in his Two Treatises of 
Civil Government as a refutation of the doctrine of the divine right 
of Kings which he regarded as a ready-made instrument of tyranny, 
and was used to justify the English Revolution of 1688. It was 
from the writings of Locke, especially his Second Treatise, that the 
colonists received their instruction in the doctrine of Natural 
Rights. How well they were instructed will be clear when you 
compare the literature of the period with Locke's writings. 
Briefly, the argument of the Second Treatise runs as follows: 
Before there was any government men were in the state of free-
dom and equality, no one having authority over another, each 
in a sense a law unto himself, subject only to the law of nature; 
for "the state of nature has a law of nature to govern it; and 
reason which is that law teaches all mankind ... that being all 
equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his 
life, health, liberty, or possessions." If anyone violates this law, 
he may be punished by the injured party "not according to the 
passionate heats ... of his own will," but only to the extent re-
quired to secure reparation and to restrain. There being ob-
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vious inconveniences and limitations in such a state, and man-
kind "being but in ill condition while they remain in it, are 
quickly driven into society ... 'tis not every compact that puts 
an end to the state of nature between men, but only this one 
of agreeing together mutually to enter into one community, and 
make one body politic." They surrender their "executive 
power," each to redress his own injuries, agree to set up a 
"legislative" to make rules of action, and an "executive" to 
enforce them; "all this directed to no other end but the peace, 
safety, and public good." The "legislative" is the supreme 
authority in the community; but it is not absolute. There re-
mains still in the people a supreme authority to alter the "legis-
lative" when they act contrary to the trust reposed in them." 
They betray their trust when they endeavor to invade the 
property of the subject, and to make themselves ... masters or 
arbitrary disposers of the lives, liberties, or fortunes of the 
people." And so of the executive "when he sets up his awn 
arbitrary will in place of the laws"; by hindering the legislature 
from assembling or from acting freely; or when "he employs 
the force, treasure and offices of the society to corrupt the repre-
sentatives of the society," or by "solicitations, threats, promises," 
brings in legislators "who have promised beforehand what to 
vote and what to enact." By such acts he puts himself "in a state 
of war against the people" who are thus "absolved from further 
obedience and left to the common refuge which God has provid-
ed for all men against force and violence." 
Who, now, shall decide when the trust has been violated? 
Locke has a ready answer: The "injured party," he says, the 
people. They do not have this power by the constitution, "yet 
they have by a law antecedent and paramount to all positive 
laws of men, reserved that ultimate determination which be-
longs to all mankind, where there lies no appeal on earth, viz., 
to judge whether they have just cause to make their appeal to 
heaven." Does not this hypothesis lay "a ferment fot frequent 
rebellion?" Perhaps, admits Locke, but no more than the ex-
ercise of despotic power which threatens the "lives, liberties, or 
fortunes of the people." But the danger of revolt is not so great 
as some imagine. "Revolutions do not happen upon every 
little mismanagement of public affairs ... great mistakes ... 
and all the slips of human fraility will be botne without mutiny 
ot murmur ... peoples are averse to quit their old constitutions 
... but if a long train of abuses, prevarications and artifices, all 
tending the same way, make the design visible to the people ... 
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it is not to be wondered that they should rouse themselves and 
endeavor to put the rule in such hands which may secure to 
them the ends for which government was at first erected ... " 
It was such "a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing 
invariably the same Object," that led to the revolt and loss of em-
pire. No one of the measures complained of was of sufficient im-
portance in its economic effects or in its political implications, to 
cause the separation.H All taken together seemed, in the light of 
the prevailing philosophy, to disclose a design, having "in direct 
object the establishment of an absolute tyranny over these states." 
In fact despotism was inherent in British colonial theory as set 
forth in the Declaratory Act of 1766, and in the reports of the 
Board of Trade already quoted. It required only the legislation of 
1774 to disclose its "absolute" character. From this there seemed 
"no appeal on earth," leaving the colonies free to decide "whether 
they had just cause to appeal to heaven." 
If we cannot agree with Alvord that England's loss of Empire 
was due to her bungling western policy, or even with Professor 
Lewis that it was "a main cause of the split" between England and 
the colonies (The Indiana Company, 77), we can agree with what 
seems to be Alvord's second thought on the subject expressed to-
ward the end of his second volume: "If historians would interpret 
rightly the causes of the American Revolution, they must not let 
their vision be circumscribed by the sequence of events in the East. 
Rather let their eyes seek a wider horizon that will bring within 
their view the occurrences beyond the mountains, where the British 
ministers experimented in imperialism and sought a basis for their 
future colonial policy in the administration of the West." 
One cannot go over the literature of this period of our history 
without being intrigued by the old question: What were the real 
motives of the men who led the colonies into the revolt? T,he prob-
lem with which we have been dealing jllustrates in some measure 
the difficulty in finding the answer to that question. A ,re<;ent 
writer in discussing the "Causes of the Revolution" has said, after 
nearly tWO centuries of labor by t,he historians, that this ~uestion 
remains "more than ever a major one." The main point,he$aYS. 
·JC .... 1 Becker, The Beginnings of the American Peoflie,215·21'l. 
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on which they are divided is the extent to which the motives of 
the patriots were economic or were political and constitutional. 
Is the distinction worth the labor spent upon it? Locke did not 
make it. He spoke always of "life, liberty, and property" as 
equally sacred. The patriots did not make it. The Virginia bill of 
rights includes among the "inherent rights" of men "the enjoyment 
of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing 
property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." Jeffer-
son expressed the same idea in happier phrase in the Declaration, 
and the Constitution throws a protecting shield about this trio of 
rights with some pre-eminence given to property. It is only in our 
time that it has become commonplace to set "human rights" off 
against "property rights" by those who think it noble to defend the 
one and ignoble, "selfish," to defend the other. It is a sign of the 
time; of the revolution through which we are muddling our way. 
Of course property has no "rights," but persons owning property 
whether natural or corporate, have, and it is not unworthy to de-
fend them. 
It seems safe, however, to predict that the debate of the historians 
will continue into the indefinite future. Those who believe that all 
history is a history of class struggle, primarily for material ends, 
will continue to regard the Revolution as a classic illustration of 
their theory. Historians of another school, who believe that men 
do not live by bread alone, will continue to stress the non-material 
motives of the revolutionists. Fully aware of the material interests 
involved in the controversy, they regard encroachments upon them 
as occasions for inquiring into and defending their "rights" estab-
lished in law, in the charters, or belonging to them as free men. 
The great watchwords of the Revolution were not mere abstractions. 
What the colonists wanted was "liberty" to do this or that; "free-
dom" from this or that. At some points the issue was economic, at 
other points non-economic. What they wanted fundamentally was 
"liberty" to enjoy the fruits of their industry: to convert their raw 
materials into goods for use, to sell their exports in the best market, 
to regulate their own currency, to move freely from one part of the 
country to another. They wanted "freedom" from arbitrary authori-
ty-from arbitrary arrest, from being sent overseas for trial, from 
being tried in admirality courts without a jury of their peers, from 
having foreign troops quartered on them in time of peace; they 
wanted freedom of speech in their legislatures without having them 
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dissolved or suspended, freedom from taxation without their con-
sent, freedom of trade, freedom from Parliamentary amendment 
of their charters. In a word, they wanted that freedom of choice 
which distinguishes free men from the unfree. 
These matters are fairly representative of the general field of 
controversy that led to separation. Who can tell whether or to what 
extent they were economic or were political and constitutional. 
Taking particular items, who can tell whether it was the economic 
loss wrought by the trade laws, or the extraordinary measures found 
necessary to enforce them, that brought the colonists to the fighting 
point? Who can tell whether those who opposed the taxes did so 
with hand on pocketbook, or with eyes on the law books from the 
Magna Charta down? Supporters of the tax measures in Parliament 
argued that the amount to be raised constituted no real grievance 
(though large enough, it appears, to warrant risking the integrity 
of Empire by pressing to secure it.) To these Burke replied: "If they 
consider nothing in taxes but their weight as pecuniary impositions, 
there might be some pretence for this denial; but men may be 
sorely touched and deeply grieved in their privileges, as well as in 
their purses. Men may lose little in property by the act which takes 
away all their freedom." Who can tell whether or to what extent 
loyal Virginians were turned into revolutionists because opportunity 
was denied them to acquire great landed estates in the West; or, 
because a few scattered Indian tribes, and a group of Pennsylvanian 
and English speculators were given preferential treatment within 
their own boundaries; or because of the ineptitude of the govern-
ment in dealing with the western question, and indeed with many 
other phases of colonial policy? 
And this brings us back once more to our text. It will be re-
called that Alvord attributes the mismanagement of the Mississippi 
Valley to "the exigencies of British politics." Well, those exigencies 
were what they were at the time because of the collapse of party 
government. The country had long-perhaps too long-been ruled 
by the Whig party, or the great Whig families, if you like. What-
ever its faults, and there seems to have been many, it had perman-
ence, continuity. On the accession of George III, all this was 
changed. The party was broken into a number of factions, led by 
this or that political personage, none of them nor the Tories strong 
enough to form a ministry; and hence the necessity of carrying on 
government by coalition ministries, difficult enough in time of 
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war and more difficult in time of peace. The most potent of these 
factions was known as the "King~s Friends," made up, Burke de-
chlred, of mediocrities who thought by attaching themselves to the 
Court to gain "a degree of power which they could never hope 
to derive from natural influence ,01' from honorable service"-a 
"cabal of the closet and the back-stairs," he contemptously called it. 
The King's great design was to restore to the Crown some of the 
power and dignity lost under the Whigs. He would make the 
ministry responsible to him as well as to Parliament. Burke sawin 
the King's plans an influence that "strikes a palsy into every nerve 
of our Constitution, making Ministers fearful of attempting and in-
capable of executing any useful plan of domestic arrangement, or 
of foreign policy." (Thoughts on the Present Discontents, 1770). 
And so it came about that during the critical period following the 
peace of 1763, British policy was determined, according to Burke, 
by u an Administration Constitutionally impotent, because support-
ed by no party." Alvord has amply illustrated this impotence in his 
study of British politics in the management of the region west of 
the mountains, and has shown the factional influences responsible 
for the policy adopted. Doubtless similar studies of other colonial 
issues as they arose would disclose a similar relationship between 
factionalism and ministerial mishaps in dealing with a large range 
of colonial affairs. 
What, it may be asked, could party government have done that 
was not, or could not, have been done by a factional regime? 
Burke's idea of party was that it is made up of a body of men bound 
together by common political principles led by men who had gained 
distinction and public confidence by public service. If such a party 
had been in power led by men of statesman stature (in which the 
country was not lacking) there would have been some comprehen-
sion of what could not be done in the colonies as well as reason-
able assurance of what could be done. Such a government might 
reasonably be expected (1) to recognize the dignity, worth, and 
maturity of the "colonials," earned by their achievements in con-
quering the wilderness and in establishing stable civil govern-
ments; (2) to study the grounds of complaint aganist the laws of 
trade before attempting to enforce them by extraordinary meafll!! of 
doubtful legality. Such a study would have disclosed that the 
regulations of a hundred years' growth, were 'heavily weighted in 
favor of British interests with little or no regard for colonial welfare; 
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that each new one tended, as Carl Becker has pointed out, to in-
crease the burden imposed by every other;42 and it might have led, 
as a matter of policy, to a recodification of the laws with due regard 
to the interest of this outlying part of the Empire. So important 
did Lecky regard the diversion of the colony trade from its natural 
channels and Grenville's enforcement policy with its attendant in-
cidents, he ventured the opinion that: "If the 'Wealth of Nations' 
had been published a century earlier, and if its principles had 
passed into legislation, it is quite possible that the separation of 
England and her colonies might have been indefinitely adjourned." 
(American Revolution. Woodburn, ed., p. 46) Such a government 
as we have supposed might (3) have adopted Shelburne's plan for 
raising an "American fund" by the sale of land and the rigorous 
collection of quit rents on old and new grants, allowing the "course 
of empire" to take its way legally as it did illegally, thus avoiding 
the most disastrous of Grenville's policies-the imposition of taxes. 
There was another feature of politics at the seat of Empire that 
•• "Only when regarded as a whole was the policy of Grenville seen to spell 
disaster. Each new law seemed carefully designed to increase the burdens im-
posed by every other. The Sugar Act, for example, taken by itself, was perhaps 
the most grievous of all. The British sugar island, to which it virtually re-
stricted the West Indian trade of the Northern colonies, offered no sufficient 
market for their lumber and provisions, nor could they, like the Spanish island, 
furnish the silver needed by continental merchants to settle London balances 
on account of imported English commodities. Exports to the West Indies and 
imports from England must, therefore, be reduced; the one event would cripple 
essential colonial industries such as the fisheries and the distilling of rum, 
while the other would force the colonists to devote themselves to these very 
<fumes tic manufactures which it was the policy of the English Government t~ 
discourage. These disadvantages, which attached to the Sugar Act itself, were 
accentuated by almost every other cardinal measure of Grenville's colonial 
policy. With the chief source of colonial specie cut off, the Stamp Act increased 
the demand for it by 60,000 pounds; when the need for paper money as a legal 
tender was more than ever felt, its further use was shortly to be forbidden 
altogether; when the diminished demand for labor, occasioned by restrictions 
upon the West Indian trade, was likely to stimulate migration into the interior. 
the West was closed to settlement. And the close of the French war, which had 
raised the debt of the colonies to an unprecedented figure, was the moment 
selected for restricting trade, remodeling the monetary system, and imposing 
upon the colonies taxes for protection against a danger which no longer 
threatened. Little wonder that to the colonial mind the measures of Grenville 
carried all the force of an argument from design: any part, separated from the 
whole, might signify nothing; the perfect correlation of the completed scheme 
was evidence enough that somewhere a malignant purpose was at work bent 
upon the destrnction of English liberties."-Beginnings of the American People, 
215-217. 
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must have strengthened the American resistance to any encroach-
ment from that quarter upon their "rights." I refer to the political 
corruption which characterized British politics during most of the 
eighteenth century. It seems to have reached classic perfection dur-
ing the long ministry of Sir Robert Walpole (1721-1742). The 
evil lived after him in the Newcastle ministry. Under the new 
monarch, the "King's Friends" set out to cure the evil: "Party was 
to be totally done away, with all its evil works. Corruption was to 
be cast down from Court." But in a few months, says Burke, they 
"soused over head and ears into the deepest and dirtiest pits of 
corruption." While the repeal of the Stamp Act was pending, Pitt 
wrote Shelburne: "The evils are I fear, incurable. Faction shakes 
and corruption saps the country to its foundation." 
All this was known to the colonists; they were kept well in-
formed by such opposition pamphlets as that of Burke and by their 
agents in London. George Croghan, the Pennsylvania back-woods-
man, was shocked by what he saw of it. Franklin, writing to his 
son, quoted the going price of a seat in Parliament and gave an 
estimate of the sterling value of the King's "corruption fund." 
George III was ready enough to bow Lord Hillsborough out of the 
ministry because by his western policy he had alienated the affection 
of the colonists for Royal government. How much more must their 
affection for him and for England have been alienated by his mis-
handling of colonial affairs due to the factionalism for which in 
large measure he was responsible; and by the reasonable suspicion 
that every decision made in London affecting the colonies was 
tainted by the great national malady from which they were es-
sentially free. For, as Lecky points out, in the colonies: "Political 
corruption, the great cancer of English life, was almost unknown." 
Such was the plight of England in the hour of triumph over an 
ancient foe-England to whom the world is so much indebted for 
her contribtuion to the principles and the administration of 
government by free men. In that hour, with the collusion if not 
under the compulsion of a wilful king, she had forsaken the path 
by which her real greatness had been attained. Shelburne under-
stood this. He notes that while four French Kings in the seven-
teenth century were raising their country "to the utmost pitch of 
grandeur," the English people were engaged in resisting encroach-
ments upon their rights and liberties by four kings of the "weak 
and bigoted house of Stuart ... and by this means procured for us 
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what was worth more than all the French conquests." (Life, 2: 358) 
Burke understood it. He told he House of Commons that in de-
crying and impairing the liberties of the Colonies, they were en-
dangering their own. "In effect," he said, "we suffer as much at 
home by this loosening of all ties, and this concussion of all estab-
lished opinions, as we do abroad; for in order to prove that the 
Americans have no rights to their liberties, we are every day en-
deavoring to subvert the maxims which preserve the whole spirit 
of our own. To prove that the Americans ought not to be free, we 
are obliged to depreciate the value of liberty itself; and we never 
seem to gain a paltry advantage over them in debate without attack-
ing some of those principles or deriding some of those feelings, for 
which our ancestors shed their blood." 
One of those principles was resistence to arbitrary authority. 
From the beginning of the constitutional struggle in the colonies 
over taxation, a few powerful voices were raised in Parliament in 
support of their position. As the purpose of the King's counter-
revolution unfolded, it was found that the home country was itself 
faced with a constitutional problem. The Wilkes affair, running 
through the second half of the 1760's, furnished a home-made 
illustration of Parliamentary usurpation which the Americans were 
resisting. The case involved questions of freedom of the press, false 
arrest and imprisonment, expulsion from Parliament and finally 
of seating a member who had not been chosen by the electors. 
Wilkes was himself an unsavory character, but he was regarded as 
a victim of ministerial persecution and the reaction was so great in 
Parliament and on the streets to the latest step in the affair, that, 
at a nod from their master, the "King's Friends" deserted the 
ministry and it fell-the fourth Whig Ministry in a row to be upset 
by the King. Meanwhile the Tories had been gaining strength and 
the King chose one of them, Lord North, to form a ministry. "His 
compact body of 'King's Friends,'" says an English historian, 
"aided by mercenary helpers from among the Whigs, preserved a 
constant majority in Parliament" for twelve years (1770-1792). It 
fell to him to retain the Tea Tax, to attempt to bribe the colonists 
into paying it, to invite trouble by sending the East India Com-
pany tea to American ports, to see the coercive acts through Parlia-
ment, to conduct a long war against his judgment, to hear of the 
surrender at Yorktown, to see his long-sustained majority melt way, 
and to see his successor negotiate for England an inglorious peace. 
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So ended what was begun, using Shelburne's words, as a "con-
stitutional war" and became a war for Independence. For twenty 
years ~ struggle had been going on between two unequal parts of 
the Empire, to establish in practice what they regarded as their 
respective "rights," confessedly ill-defined, under the English con-
stitution, various charter grants, and under the great "charter of 
nature.' We can best look upon the struggle as a series of "challenge" 
and "responses," between the two parties to the conflict. Both parties 
had to learn in the hard way that they had only such "rights" as 
they found on experience they could exercise. There are many 
things in the American conduct of the revolution we must wish 
were otherwise-acts that were unlawful under any code, mob vio-
lence, destruction of other men's property, the treatment of the 
loyalists. If, however, we center our attention upon the leaders of 
the Revolution from the beginning to its consummation in the 
establishment of the Republic, we cannot but admire and approve, 
barring a few slips of sharp practice, their wisdoin, their integrity, 
courage and persistence, the high level of their statesmanship; and 
be everlastingly grateful to them (or the heritage they left us. 
